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NEW YORK CITY'S LOCALLY BASED
ENTERPRISE SET-ASIDE: LEGITIMATE
EXERCISE OF MAYORAL POWER OR
UNCONSTITUTIONAL QUOTA IN DISGUISE?
I. Introduction
Bringing minorities and other disadvantaged groups into the economic mainstream is widely accepted as a legitimate government
activity.' Numerous programs on the federal and local levels have
been developed to attain this goal. 2 Agreement on the importance of
promoting equal opportunity, however, has not always translated into
agreement on the means selected to reach this goal. For instance, some
programs have involved preferential treatment for members of disadvantaged groups at the expense of those individuals who are already
within the mainstream. 3 These programs have been subjected to4 challenge on equal protection grounds as "reverse discrimination."
1. Government efforts have been directed at aiding both the minority employee
and the minority employer. For an overview of congressional and presidential action
to eliminate discrimination in employment, see Note, Doing Good the Wrong Way:
The Case for Delimiting PresidentialPower Under Executive Order No. 11,246, 33
VAND. L. REV. 921, 921 nn. 2-3 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Doing Good the Wrong
Way ](list includes, e.g., Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1972, Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Age Discrimination Act of 1975, as well as relevant presidential Executive Orders since 1941). A
representative list of the many federal programs to encourage minority businesses is
found in Levinson, A Study of Preferential Treatment: The Evolution of Minority
Business Enterprise Assistance Programs, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 61, 61 n.1
(1980)(programs have been initiated pursuant to Executive Order No. 11,625 and to
specific congressional enactments, such as Small Business Act § 8(a) and (d) and
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, § 905).
2. Id.
3. See Comment, Beyond Strict Scrutiny: The Limits of CongressionalPower to
Use Racial Discrimination, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 617, 617-18 (1979). These measures
have come to be known as affirmative action, which has been defined as the use of
"benign racial classifications" to remedy the effects of past discrimination. Affirmative action may take one of three forms: (1) a court order pursuant to the fourteenth
amendment or a civil rights statute after a judicial finding of particular discriminatory practices; (2) a voluntary program initiated by a governmental agency or private
organization; or (3) a legislatively mandated program. Id. The terms "affirmative
action" and "preferential treatment" will be used interchangeably throughout this
Note.
4. The Supreme Court has considered reverse discrimination cases on three
separate occasions, with mixed results. The use of benign racial quotas was first
examined in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
The Court rejected the special admissions plan under which the Medical School of
the University of California at Davis set aside a number of places for qualified
minority applicants, but did not invalidate the use of race as a factor in considering
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New York City, in addition to complying with federal and state
guidelines, has sought to foster equal opportunity by means of mayoral executive orders prescribing minority hiring goals and other preferential treatment. 5 No such executive order, however, has survived
the scrutiny of the courts. In 1968, Mayor Lindsay issued Executive
Order No. 71, which conditioned the awarding of city construction
contracts upon submission by the bidder of an affirmative action
program. The order also empowered the Deputy Mayor-City Administrator to formulate rules and regulations to implement its provisions. 6
Executive Order No. 71, and two sets of rules and regulations promulgated to implement it, were invalidated by the New York State Court
of Appeals for exceeding mayoral power and for mandating quotas of
7
questionable constitutional character .
Executive Order No. 53, issued by Mayor Koch in 1980, attempted
to satisfy the court's objections to the city's earlier affirmative action
efforts under Executive Order No. 71 by proposing a plan for preferential treatment that did not involve racial or ethnic classification, but
rather relied on social and economic criteria. Executive Order No. 53
created a locally based enterprise set-aside, whereby city agencies
were directed to seek to award ten percent of all city construction
contracts to locally based enterprises (LBEs), which were defined as
small businesses either earning 25 percent of their receipts from work
in economically disadvantaged areas or employing a workforce at
least 25 percent of which is economically disadvantaged. 8 The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, however, struck down Executive

applications for admissions. In United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979), the Court held that the ban against racial discrimination in employment
practices contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not prohibit a
private employer and a union from voluntarily agreeing upon an affirmative action
plan giving preferential treatment to minority apprentices. A congressionally-enacted affirmative action plan for minority business enterprises was upheld by the
Court in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). See infra notes 82-98 and
accompanying text. See generally, Lavinsky, The Affirmative Action Trilogy and
Benign Racial Classifications-Evolving Law in Need of Standards, 27 WAYNE L.
REV. 1 (1980). While the Supreme Court has not ruled out all use of benign racial
classifications, the justices have been unable to agree on the precise circumstances in
which such classifications might satisfy equal protection guarantees. See infra notes
156-61 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 18-27, 51-64 and accompanying text.
6. 96 THE CITY RECORD 2842 (April 10, 1968).
7. Broidrick v. Lindsay, 39 N.Y.2d 641, 350 N.E.2d 595, 385 N.Y.S.2d 265
(1976); Fullilove v. Beame, 48 N.Y.2d 376, 398 N.E.2d 765, 423 N.Y.S.2d 144
(1979). See infra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
8. 108 THE CITY RECORD 2275 (Aug. 22, 1980). See infra notes 51-64 and
accompanying text.
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Order No. 53.9 The court found the order to be an improper exercise
of legislative power by the executive branch and an unconstitutional
quota in disguise. Furthermore, the court held that Executive Order
No. 53 was inconsistent with existing state laws on competitive bidding.' 0
In reaching its conclusion, the appellate division treated Executive
Orders No. 53 and 71 as identical. " Nevertheless, there are significant
differences between them. After comparing Executive Order No. 53 to
the earlier order and to other preferential treatment programs with
which it shares key features, this Note examines each of the grounds
given for invalidating Executive Order No. 53.12 It concludes that the
differences between the orders are significant enough to enable Executive Order No. 53 to withstand judicial review. Unlike racial classifications, which trigger strict equal protection scrutiny, the LBE preference, because it is socially and economically based, is better
equipped to survive equal protection analysis. In addition, this Note
argues that the absence of legislative authorization does not preclude
the mayor from instituting a preferential treatment program on his
own initiative, provided that he has independent authority to take
such action. Finally, this Note suggests an interpretation of the term
"lowest responsible bidder" that includes the concept of "social responsibility," thus eliminating any potential conflict between Executive Order No. 53 and the competitive bidding requirements of state
and local statutes.'

3

II. Minority Hiring Quotas and Executive Order No. 71: Limiting
the Mayor's Power to Initiate Affirmative Action
In the 1960's, federal efforts to ensure equal employment opportunity for minorities proceeded along two separate lines. In Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress imposed fair employment
obligations on contractors dealing with the federal government or
working on federally assisted projects. '4 Shortly after the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act, President Johnson issued Executive Order No.

9. Subcontractors Trade Ass'n v. Koch, 96 A.D.2d. 774, 465 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st
Dep't 1983), appeal docketed, No. 1326 (N.Y. Aug. 5, 1983).
10. Id. at 827. See inJra notes 78-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the decision.

11. See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Parts IV-VI, notes 140-243 and accompanying text,
13. See infra notes 212-43 and accompanying text.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. V 1981).
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11,246, which required all federally-assisted construction contracts to
include provisions for affirmative action to ensure equal employment
opportunity. 15 The first major program developed pursuant to Executive Order No. 11,246 was the Philadelphia Plan, which had as its
central feature the requirement that contractors submit with their
bids a statement of minority employment "goals.' 16 The Philadelphia
Plan, the validity of which was upheld by the Third Circuit,' 7 became
the prototype for subsequent programs implementing Executive Order
No. 11,246 in other metropolitan areas, including New York City.
A. Broidrick v. Lindsay
New York City set forth its own equal employment requirements in
Executive Order No. 71, signed by Mayor Lindsay on April 2, 1968.18

15. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1981). Tile use of
presidential executive orders to combat employment discrimination began in the
1940s. The early orders prohibited discrimination by government defense contractors
and derived their authority from various war powers acts and defense production
acts, but did not require the contractors to take any specific actions. See Doing Good
the Wrong Way, supra note 1, at 923-24. The scope of presidential action was
substantially expanded in 1961 with the appearance of the first affirmative action
provision in an executive order. See Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448, 450
(1959-60).
16. The text of the plan, and the circumstances surrounding its development, are
discussed in Comment, The PhiladelphiaPlan: A Study in the Dyniamics of Execntive
Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 739-43 (1972).
17. Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). The court reviewed the use of presidential executive orders in the area of employment discrimination and concluded that the Philadelphia Plan was within the implied authority of the President. Id. at 166-71. In
considering the effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on Executive Order No. 11,246,
the court held that congressional action had not preempted the field of equal employment opportunity and that the provision in Title VII prohibiting preferential treatment based on race did not prevent the Philadelphia Plan from being "color-conscious" in its attempt to remedy the absence of minority workers in the construction
trades. Id. at 171-73.
The use of specific percentage goals and timetables for minority hiring has also
been upheld by other courts reviewing programs similar to the Philadelphia Plan.
See, e.g., Southern Illinois Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 327 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Ill.
1971), afJ'd, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972)(Illinois Ogilvie Plan); Joyce v. McCrane,
320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970)(Newark Plan); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community
College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004
(1970) (Cleveland Plan).

18. 96

THE CITY RECORD

2842 (April 10, 1968). The executive order has been

frequently used by New York City mayors in exercising the powers of their office.
One of the most widespread applications of the executive order has been to make

appointments. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 2, 106

THE CITY RECORD

52 (Jan. 1,

1978)(appointing seven deputy mayors); Exec. Order No. 8, 106 THE CITY RECORD
663 (March 15, 1978)(appointing Health Services Administrator). Executive orders
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The influence of presidential Executive Order No. 11,246 is apparent
both in the use of governmental contracting powers to ensure equal
employment compliance and in the specific non-discrimination provisions to be incorporated into the contracts. Under Executive Order
No. 71, all city construction contracts, as well as all city-assisted
construction contracts, had to contain a pledge by the contractor to
refrain from discriminating against any employee or applicant for
employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin and to
undertake affirmative action to ensure equal employment opportunity. 19 The order also required the contractor to include these nondiscrimination provisions in all of its subcontracts and to cooperate
with the contracting agency to enforce compliance by the subcontractor.

20

In December, 1970, New York City joined a federally approved
state-wide plan to establish a training program in the construction
industry. The state plan was intended to replace local affirmative
action programs throughout the state with a uniform affirmative
action program conforming to the applicable federal, state and city
legislation, regulations, and executive orders. 21 New York City withdrew from the plan in 1973 when progress being made under the plan
did not meet city expectations, and reinstated the affirmative action
program that had been in effect under Executive Order No. 71.22 The

have also been used to further policy goals by creating various commissions designed
to meet recognized public needs, see Exec. Order No. 13, 106 THE CITY RECORD 1319
(May 22, 1978)(establishing Council on the Environment); Exec. Order No. 30, 107
THE CITY RECORD 2047 (July 12, 1979)(establishing city-wide occupational safety and

health committee); Exec. Order No. 37, 107

THE CITY RECORD

3443 (Nov. 1,

1979)(establishing Productivity Council), or to express policy objectives, see Exec.
Order No. 20, 98 THE CITY RECORD 4931 (July 20, 1970)(requiring good faith efforts
to train minority group workers).
19. Exec. Order No. 71, § 2(a)(1), 96 THE CITY RECORD 2842 (April 10, 1968).
The order conditioned the awarding of city contracts on submission by the bidder of
an acceptable affirmative action program. Id. § 9(a).
20. Id. § 2(b). Failure of the contractor or the subcontractor to comply with
these provisions may result in publication of the offender's name, recommendation of
legal action, cancellation, suspension or termination of the contract, and a declaration that the contractor is ineligible for further city contracts. Id. § 8(e)-(f). Executive
Order No. 20, dated July 20, 1970, provided for on-the-job training programs and
the rapid advancement of qualified minority employees in city-financed or cityassisted construction projects. 98 THE CITY RECORD 4931 (July 20, 1970).
21. For a description of the terms of the other local affirmative action programs
(the Rochester and Buffalo plans), as well as the circumstances surrounding the
establishment of the state-wide plan, see Note, The Infirmities of Affirmative Action:
The New York City Plan, 2 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 305, 321-23 (1974)[hereinafter cited
as The Infirmities of Affirmative Action].
22. Id. at 325-26.
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Deputy Mayor-City Administrator, acting pursuant to the authority
vested in him by Executive Order No. 71, promulgated rules and
regulations to implement the city's plan (1973 Rules and Regulations) .23 The rules applied to construction contracts receiving direct or
indirect city financial assistance, and required contractors to make
good faith efforts to employ certain percentages of minority workers
within ranges set by the city. 24 The rules also required contractors to
participate in programs to advance minority trainees to "journeyman"
status, 25 and called for monthly compliance reports. 26 In terms of its
goal, the correction of racial imbalance in the construction industry,
and its approach, specifying percentages of minority employment in
proportion to the local minority population, New York City's program
closely resembled the Philadelphia Plan.27
The validity of Executive Order No. 71 and the 1973 Rules and
Regulations was challenged in Broidrick v. Lindsay,28 an action
brought by representatives of the city's construction industry. 29 The
New York State Court of Appeals, in a unanimous decision, struck
down the rules as being in excess of mayoral power. 30 The holding was
23. 101 THE CITY RECORD 2594 (July 14, 1973)[hereinafter cited as 1973 Rules
and Regulations].
24. 1973 Rules and Regulations, § 2(a). The minimum goal, to be attained by
1978 through annual increments, was to "employ minority journeymen in each
building and construction trade in approximately the same proportional representation as the percentage of minorities in the population of the City of New York." Id. §
2(a)(1).
25. Id.§ 2(b).
26. Id. § 3. The sanctions provided for in the rules, id. § 4, were the same as
those in the executive order. See supra note 20.
27. See supra note 16. It has been suggested that the New York City Plan
represented an improvement over the Philadelphia Plan in that it defined good faith
in narrower terms, thus making it more difficult for the contractor to evade his
responsibilities, and provided for swifter reprisals against those who fail to act in
good faith. See Note, The Infirmities of Affirmative Action, supra note 18, at 328.
Judicial review of the plan, however, has focused not on the likelihood of its success,
but on whether it exceeded mayoral power. See infra note 30.
The reactivation of Executive Order No. 71 meant that on projects funded by a
combination of city and federal money, contractors would have to comply with two
different sets of affirmative action requirements. The issue of whether federal equal
employment regulations prohibit action by the city in that area was resolved in the
city's favor in City of New York v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
which upheld the power of the city to apply its own equal opportunity rules on
federally-assisted projects as long as these rules were not in conflict with federal law.
28. 39 N.Y.2d 641, 350 N.E.2d 595, 385 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976)(Breitel, Ch. J.).
29. Plaintiffs in the action were trustees of the New York Building and Construction Industry Board of Urban Affairs Fund. Id.
30. 39 N.Y.2d at 644, 350 N.E.2d at 596, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 266. The court also
invalidated the regulations for being inconsistent with existing state law governing
apprenticeship programs, which provide that apprentices shall be selected solely on
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based on a reading of the applicable city law on employment discrimination. 3' The court acknowledged that the executive branch has a
certain amount of flexibility in fulfilling its responsibility to enforce
legislation, especially in an area as sensitive as eliminating discriminatory practices. Nevertheless, the court held that the executive branch
may not usurp the legislative function by adopting a policy different
from that contemplated by the legislature. "2 Mandating minority employment percentages was, in the opinion of the court, such an unauthorized expansion of policy, reaching beyond the means prescribed
by the New York City Administrative Code to remedy discrimination.

33

In reaching its conclusion, the court declined to follow those federal
cases which had upheld the use of presidential executive orders to
mandate minority employment percentages on the basis that they
were rationally related to cost considerations.3 4 The mayoral regulations, in the court's view, were not so related. Because they applied to
all of a contractor's projects, regardless of whether city funds were
involved, there would be instances where establishing minority employment percentages would have no effect on the costs of city-sponsored projects.3 5 Rather than seeking to save money, the regulations
were an "attempt to use the city's contracting power to promote an
extrinsic social policy, for which there is no grant of legislative
power. "3

the basis of objective qualifications without any consideration of minority status.
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 815(5) (McKinney 1977) and N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(1-a)(a)(McKinney 1982). See 39 N.Y.2d at 648, 350 N.E.2d at 600, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 269. The
regulations, in contrast, require that one minority apprentice be accepted for every
three non-minority apprentices. 1973 Rules and Regulations § 3(c). See 39 N.Y.2d at
648, 350 N.E.2d at 600, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
31. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 343-8.0 (1966)("[i]t shall be unlawful for any person
engaged . . . in . . . construction . . . pursuant to a contract with the cit' . . . to
refuse to employ or to refuse to continue in any employment any person on account of
the race, color or creed of such person"). Section 343-8.0 further prohibits employers
from seeking information about the race, color or creed of an employee or applicant.

Id.
32. 39 N.Y.2d at 645-46, 350 N.E.2d at 597-98, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
33. Id. at 646-47, 350 N.E.2d at 597-98, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 267. The only affirmative requirement expressed in section 343-8.0, as the court noted, was that all city
contracts contain the anti-discrimination provisions set forth in subdivisions (a) and
(b). Id.
34. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159

(1971).
35. 39 N.Y.2d at 648, 350 N.E.2d at 599, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 268-69.
36. Id. The court also distinguished Broidrick from the line of federal cases
upholding employment ratios to correct past discrimination in the context of a
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The court also questioned the constitutionality of the executive
regulations, noting that the employment percentages were, in effect,
quotas that substituted a standard based on the ethnic composition of
a specific area for the standard of individual merit. 37 Nevertheless, the
court was careful not to rule out all executive-initiated affirmative
action. For example, a program based on discrimination-free merit
selection directed at increasing the pool of those eligible for employment by including previously excluded minority workers would be
permissible.

B.

3 8

Fullilove v. Beame

New York City made another effort to require affirmative action in
the construction industry in 1977 when Mayor Beame directed the city
administrator to promulgate a new set of rules and regulations (1977
Rules and Regulations) pursuant to Executive Order No. 71 . 3 The
new rules required, as did the earlier rules, that contractors submit
with their bids a program to increase minority representation within
their workforce. 40 The new rules, however, attempted to meet the
objections raised in Broidrick by avoiding specific percentages and
timetables, and by restricting application of the rules to city-funded
and city-assisted construction contracts. 4' To help the rules pass judicial scrutiny, other provisions were included which outlined in greater
detail than did the 1973 Rules and Regulations the specific steps an
employer could take to be in compliance 42 and the procedures for
4 3
administrative review where the goals had not been achieved.
judicial remedy under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 649, 350

N.E.2d at 599, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
37. Id. at 647, 350 N.E.2d at 598, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 268. That the court felt
compelled to address the constitutional question even though it was not necessary for
its decision would seem to indicate a fundamental aversion to the use of quotas. The
proper method of prohibiting discrimination, according to the court, would be to
allow individual employment opportunity without invidious impediments. Id.
38. Id. Cf. State Div. of Human Rights v. Kilian Mfg. Corp., 35 N.Y.2d 201, 318

N.E.2d 770, 360 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1974)(upholding order by State Division of Human
Rights finding manufacturer guilty of discriminatory hiring practices and directing
manufacturer to engage in affirmative action to recruit minority employees). A
similar rationale for justifying the government's interest in promoting affirmative
action in the construction industry had been presented in Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa.
v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d at 170-71.

39. 95 THE CITY RECORD 767 (Jan. 15, 1977)[hereinafter cited as 1977 Rules and
Regulations].
40. 1977 Rules and Regulations, § 3.
41. Id.
42. Id. § 6.
43. Id. § 6(e).
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Despite these adjustments, the 1977 Rules and Regulations, when
challenged by several building contractor associations and labor organizations, fared no better than the 1973 Rules and Regulations. In
Fullilove v. Beame, 4 the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its Broidrick
holding that adopting a policy of affirmative action, however desirable it might be, was the prerogative of the legislative branch. 45
Relying on its analysis in Broidrick, the court, in a brief per curiam
opinion, stressed that it was not merely the means employed to
achieve racial balance, that is, the regulations, that were defective.
Rather, it was the very attempt itself by the executive to impose
affirmative action requirements without specific legislative authorization that was improper. In the court's view, any independent exercise
of mayoral power in this area was invalid.4 6
The city's effort to tailor the rules and regulations to satisfy the
Broidrick standards did not pass the court entirely without comment.
The dissenting opinion questioned the majority's reading of Broidrick,
arguing that the majority's view would leave the heads of state and
local governments powerless to take meaningful steps to enforce state
and local policies against discrimination.4 7 The mayoral executive

44. 48 N.Y.2d 376, 398 N.E.2d 765, 423 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1979).
45. Id. at 379, 398 N.E.2d at 766, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
46. Id. The court acknowledged that the state legislature had endorsed the
voluntary use of state-approved affirmative action plans, see ExEc. LAW § 296(12)
(McKinney 1982), but held that permitting voluntary affirmative action could not be
equated with directing that such action be undertaken involuntarily under the threat
of legal sanction. 48 N.Y.2d at 378, 398 N.E.2d at 765-66, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 144-45.
That executive power at the state level was subject to the same limitations as
mayoral action was made clear by the court in a decision handed down the same day
as Fullilove v. Beame, affirming without opinion the overturning of a gubernatorial
executive order directing contractors to undertake affirmative action programs to
promote minority manpower utilization. See Fullilove v. Carey, 48 N.Y.2d 826, 399
N.E.2d 1203, 424 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1979), aJJ'g 62 A.D.2d 798, 406 N.Y.S.2d 888 (3d
Dep't 1978). Executive Order No. 45, signed by Governor Carey on January 4, 1977,
provided for essentially the same type of program incorporating goals and timetables
as that mandated by mayoral Executive Order No. 71. See [1977] 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §
3.45. Just as the mayoral order exceeded legislative authorization under section 3438.0 of the New York City Administrative Code, the gubernatorial order, in the
appellate division's view, went beyond the type of action envisioned in the nondiscrimination provisions of New York Labor Law section 220-e. 62 A.D.2d at 80001, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 889. That court held that it was not necessary to wait until the
State Commissioner of Human Rights developed regulations pursuant to his authority under Executive Order No. 45 to review the validity of the order, inasmuch as the
issue at stake was the extent of executive power. Id. at 800-01, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 88990.
47. Fullilove v. Beame, 48 N.Y.2d at 379, 382-84, 398 N.E.2d at 766, 768-69,
423 N.Y.S.2d at 145, 147-49 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). Judge Fuchsberg prefaced
his dissent by attempting to remove the "scare factor" from affirmative action.

712
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order was, in the dissent's view, a valid exercise of executive power.
The program took costs into consideration and was directed against a
specific pattern of discrimination within the construction industry.4 8
Moreover, the new city regulations avoided the pitfalls of the earlier
regulations: the new regulations applied only to city contracts and
city-assisted contracts, provided greater procedural fairness 49 and,
although race-conscious, did not depart from the principles of merit
selection. 50 Thus, the dissent suggests that an executive-implemented
affirmative action program is not facially invalid, and articulates
circumstances under which the Broidrick standards might be satisfied.

III. Executive Order No. 53: The Use of Racially Neutral Criteria
to Aid the Underprivileged
Less than one year after Fullilove v. Beame was decided, Mayor
Koch issued Executive Order No. 53, in which he utilized conditions
attached to city construction contracts to achieve a different set of
policy objectives. Abandoning the efforts aimed specifically at minorities, Mayor Koch focused on the economically disadvantaged in general. Executive Order No. 53 sought to aid the economically disadvantaged by increasing their direct and indirect involvement in city
construction contracts. 5' This change of orientation was motivated
both by Mayor Koch's desire to circumvent the limitations on mayoral

Although affirmative action sometimes leads to the imposition of quotas, which
Judge Fuchsberg, like the rest of the court, viewed with disfavor, such quotas are not
essential to the primary goal of affirmative action, namely, fostering equal opportunity by taking positive steps to speed the elimination of the stubborn vestiges of
discrimination. Id. at 379-80, 398 N.E.2d at 766-67, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 145-46.
48. Id. at 380, 398 N.E.2d at 767, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
49. Id. at 381-82, 398 N.E.2d at 767-68, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 147. As an example of
the regulations' procedural fairness, Judge Fuchsberg pointed to the provisions for
reviewing a contractor's failure to achieve the anticipated goals before sanctions were
imposed. Id.
50. Id. Judge Fuchsberg also reviewed legislative manifestations of support for
affimative action as expressed in other laws to show that the mayor's actions were
consistent with the policies of the state. Id. at 382-86, 398 N.E.2d at 768-70, 423
N.Y.S.2d at 147-50.
51. The order was promulgated on August 1, 1980. Its stated purpose was "to
promote the development of business and employment within economic development
areas of the City of New York by ensuring that small enterprises conducting business
in such areas, or employing economically disadvantaged persons, receive a greater
share of all construction contracts awarded by the City of New York." Exec. Order.
No. 53, § 1, 108 THE CITY RECORD 2275 (Aug. 22, 1980).
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power imposed by Broidrick and Beame, and by his opposition to
52
racially-based affirmative action.
A. Assisting Locally Based Enterprises
Executive Order No. 53 directed all city contracting agency heads
to "seek to ensure that not less than ten percent of the total dollar
amount of all contracts awarded for construction projects . . . be
awarded to locally based enterprises.- 53 The order also required that
in the event that any part of the contract was subcontracted, at least
54
ten percent of the total dollar amount was to be set aside for LBEs.
The order further provided for the inclusion of a non-discrimination
55
clause in all contracts.
Pursuant to the authority vested in it by the order, 56 the Bureau of
Labor Services promulgated rules and regulations which were made
applicable to all construction contracts awarded by the city, except
those which received federal and state funds and were subject to
conflicting requirements. 5 7 The regulations established that, for a
business to qualify as an LBE, it must have: (1) annual gross receipts
of $500,000 or less and (2) either earn 25 percent of these receipts from
work in economic development areas or employ a work force of which

52. N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1980, at A31, col. 3. Earlier in 1980, Mayor Koch
promulgated Executive Order No. 50, the purpose of which was to ensure compliance with the equal employment opportunity requirements of city, state and federal
law in city contracting. Exec. Order No. 50, § 1, 108 THE CITY RECORD 1869 (April
25, 1980). Unlike the invalidated Executive Order No. 71, Executive Order No. 50
did not contain any specific programs or goals, but rather restated the responsibilities
of the Bureau of Labor Services, which continued to have the responsibility for
monitoring compliance. Id. §§ 2, 4.
53. Exec. Order No. 53, § 3, 108 THE CITY RECORD 2275. No statistical justification was offered by the city for setting the amount of the apportionment at ten
percent. The city apparently borrowed this figure from court-approved federal legislation enacting a ten percent minority business enterprise set-aside. See injra note 79
and accompanying text.
54. Id. at 2275, § 4(a).
55. This clause obligated the contractor not to "discriminate unlawfully on the
basis of race, creed, color, national origin, sex, age, handicap, marital status, sexual
orientation or affectional preference in the selection of subcontractors." Id. § 4(b).
56. Id. § 6.
57. Participation by Locally Based Enterprises in Construction Contracts
Awarded by the City of New York, § 53.11, 109 THE CITY RECORD 359 (Feb. 19,
1981)[hereinafter cited as 1981 Rules and Regulations]. For example, a federally
funded program may mandate a minority business enterprise set-aside, in which case
the contractor would not have to comply with the LBE set-aside.
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at least 25 percent are economically disadvantaged persons.5 8 To ensure that participation would be limited to bona fide LBEs, the
regulations prescribed detailed eligibility requirements 59 and entrusted to the Office of Economic Development the verification of
certification documents submitted by prospective LBEs. 6 0 Unlike the
earlier programs under Executive Order No. 71, contractors could not
rely on a "good faith" defense; compliance was defined in terms
implying strict adherence with Executive Order No. 53 and its regulations. " ' A contractor, however, need make only a reasonable effort to
identify LBE subcontractors. 62 Furthermore, the contractor was assured of fair treatment by the requirement that conciliation efforts
and, where these are unsuccessful, administrative hearings, precede
the imposition of sanctions.

63

58. Id. § 53.12M. "Economic development area" is defined as "those areas of the
city delegated as eligible for participation in the Community Development Block
Grant Program of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development." Id. § 53.12J. "Economically disadvantaged person" is defined to include (1) a
resident in a single person household earning 70 percent or less of the "'urban family
budget" for the city, as determined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United
States Department of Labor; (2) a member of a family which has a family income of
70 percent or less of the "urban family budget" or receives federal, state or local cash
welfare payments; (3) an unemployed Vietnam war veteran; or (4) a displaced
homemaker returning to work. Id. § 53.12K.
59. Id. § 53.21.
60. Id. § 53.30.
61. Id. § 53.12D. Failure to comply with the terms of Executive Order No. 53
and the accompanying regulations leads to the imposition of any or all of the
following sanctions: (1) reduction of the contractor's compensation by an amount
equal to the dollar value of the percentage of the set-aside not awarded to LBE
subcontractors; (2) declaring the contractor in default; and (3) declaring the contractor ineligible to participate in the LBE program for a period of tip to three years. Id.
§ 53.46. As of February, 1984, none of the authorized sanctions had been imposed.
Telephone interview with Daniel Kryston, Legal Counsel, Office of Dir. of Constr.
(Feb. 14, 1984).
62. Id. § 53.44. The LBE subcontractor set-aside may be waived only where
both the contractor and the contracting agency have determined that there is no LBE
subcontractor reasonably available or when the contract involves an emergency
requiring immediate attention because of a threat to public health, safety, or welfare. Id.
To improve compliance with Executive Order No. 53, the Office of the Director of
Construction issued supplementary guidelines in January, 1984. The new guidelines
require city agencies to take a more active role in identifying opportunities for LBE
prime contractors and subcontractors, attracting bids from LBEs, and tracking the
performance once contracts have been awarded. As part of the new procedures, all
waivers must now be approved by the Director of Construction. Compliance Guidelines for Executive Order No. 53 (1980) Locally Based Enterprise Program, Directive
No. 45, Office of Dir. of Constr., Office of the Mayor (Jan. 13, 1984).
63. 1981 Rules and Regulations, § 53.45(e).
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After a slow start, the level of compliance with Executive Order
No. 53 has steadily increased. As of the middle of the 1984 fiscal year,
there are 300 firms enrolled in the LBE program, accounting for 15
64
percent of the city's contracts to which the LBE set-aside applies.
B.

SubcontractorsTrade Association v. Koch

In 1982, seventeen New York City area trade associations challenged Executive Order No. 53 and the accompanying rules and
regulations as unconstitutional, illegal and unenforceable in Subcontractors Trade Association v. Koch.6 5 The complaint specifically alleged that the order exceeded mayoral authority, contravened state
and city competitive bidding requirements, violated equal protection
guarantees, and was inconsistent with the holdings in Broidrick and
Beame.6 6 The trial court dismissed the complaint.6 7 On appeal, the
appellate division reversed by a 3-2 decision.6 8 In a memorandum
opinion, the court stated that Executive Order No. 53 was "but another undisguised attempt on the part of the Executive branch to
mandate unconstitutional 'quotas.' "169 In concluding that such an
7 1
attempt was invalid,70 the Subcontractors court relied on Broidrick
and Beame, 72 both of which had held executive-sponsored affirmative
action to be an improper exercise of legislative power. 73 No distinction
was made between the types of affirmative action mandated by the
two executive orders. In particular, the court did not consider that the

64. Telephone interview with Daniel Kryston, Legal Counsel, Office of Dir. of
Constr. (Feb. 14, 1984). The dollar value of the contracts awarded to LBEs was $30
million in fiscal year 1983 and is expected to increase during fiscal year 1984.
Compliance with the MBE set-aside on federally-funded construction projects is
currently at 17%, which is also above the minimum. Id.
65. 96 A.D.2d 774, 465 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st Dep't 1983).
66. Complaint at 5, Subcontractors Trade Ass'n v. Koch, 96 A.D.2d 774, 465
N.Y.S.2d 825 (1983)(reprinted in Record on Appeal).
67. Memorandum Opinion at 10, Subcontractors Trade Ass'n v. Koch, 96
A.D.2d 774, 465 N.Y.S.2d 825 (trial court decision, reprinted in Record on Appeal).
68. Subcontractors Trade Ass'n v. Koch, 96 A.D.2d 774, 465 N.Y.S.2d 825.
Repeal of the program has been stayed pending appeal.
69. Id. at 775, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 827. As a threshold matter, the court determined
that the plaintiff trade associations had standing to challenge the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 53. Even though no dispute had actually arisen under the order,
the plaintiffs were directly affected by, and subject to, the order's requirements. Id.
70. Id.
71. 39 N.Y.2d 641, 350 N.E.2d 595, 385 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976). Seesupra notes 2833 and accompanying text.
72. 48 N.Y.2d 376, 398 N.E.2d 765, 423 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1979). See supra notes 4446 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 32-33, 44-46 and accompanying text.
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LBE set-aside of Executive Order No. 53, unlike the minority hiring
goals of Executive Order No. 71, was not racially based. The court
also held Executive Order No. 53 unlawful for allowing LBEs to
escape the competitive bidding provisions of General Municipal Law
section 103(b) and New York City Charter section 343(b), under
which city contracts are to be awarded to the lowest responsible
bidder.74

The shift from minority-oriented to economically based considerations, however, was acknowledged by the dissent. In distinguishing
between Executive Order No. 71 and Executive Order No. 53, the
dissenting opinion specifically noted that the latter was not intended
to establish racial quotas. Rather, Executive Order No. 53 was intended to improve the economic viability of depressed and deprived
areas of the city by increasing the participation in city contracts of
small enterprises doing business in those areas and of economically
disadvantaged workers.7 5 Its primary aim, therefore, was "to enlarge
the pool of persons eligible for employment, based on discrimination
free merit selection." 76 The dissent found specific authorization for
Executive Order No. 53 in the New York City Charter, which empowered the mayor to issue directives and adopt rules and regulations in

74. Subcontractors Trade Ass'n v. Koch, 96 A.D.2d at 775, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
Although the court did not elaborate upon this point, it apparently assumed that
under the LBE set-aside, contracts would be awarded irrespective of the amount of
the bids or the existence of lower bids. See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
75. 96 A.D.2d at 775-76, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 827-28 (Alexander, J., dissenting). The
dissent emphasized that Executive Order No. 53 provided for an attempt to be made
to direct more business to LBEs. Id. The dissent interpreted this language as suggesting that the LBE program was not as inflexible as the minority hiring goals set
pursuant to Executive Order No. 71, even though the LBE set-aside does establish a
specific numerical goal (ten percent of all contracts). The essential distinction, however, is not that Executive Order No. 53 avoids the use of quotas, but that it does not
impose a racial quota. The effect of the change in criteria to social and economic
classifications with respect to equal protection analysis is examined at infra notes 16984 and accompanying text.
The dissenting opinion's distinction between racial quotas and programs aimed at
improving the economic viability of underdeveloped areas has been applied to uphold the equal employment opportunity requirements of Executive Order No. 50,
supra note 52. See Great Neck Electric, Inc. v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J., March 1,
1984, at 12, col.2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County)(court held that Executive Order No. 50 is
necessary to accommodate broad legislative policy which has salutary purpose of
eliminating discrimination in employment; thus, requiring report indicating number
of women and minorities in employer's workforce is not legislation by fiat).
76. 96 A.D.2d at 775, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 827. This is one of the permissible uses of
affirmative action endorsed by the Court of Appeals in Broidrick v. Lindsay. See
supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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regard to the execution of capital projects.77 In addition, the dissent
found that there was no violation of the statutory competitive bidding
requirements since the regulations required that the award would still
8
be made to the lowest "qualified" bidder.
IV. A Comparison of the LBE Set-Aside to Other Types of
Preferential Treatment
Although Executive Order No. 53 rejects the use of racially based
criteria, it incorporates other features common to many affirmative
action programs. The most significant of these features is the set-aside
itself, by which aid is directed to local businesses in economically
underdeveloped areas. As employed in the other programs, however,
the set-aside has aimed at encouraging minority business enterprises
(MBEs), and has made minority ownership the primary qualification
for participation. Two of the more noteworthy examples of MBE setasides are those authorized by the Public Works Employment Act
(PWEA) of 197779 and the Small Business Administration Act. 80 The
other key feature of Executive Order No. 53, the requirement that the
participant or his workforce be locally based, also has its precedent on
the federal level, namely, in section 3 of the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968,81 which created a preference for the employment of local residents in federal housing projects. A brief examination of these three programs and the court decisions upholding their
validity will complete the background necessary for an analysis of the
validity of the LBE set-aside.
A. The PWEA of 1977
The first congressionally enacted MBE set-aside, and the one which
has been given the most attention by the courts and commentators, is
the MBE set-aside incorporated as an amendment to the PWEA of
1977.82 The amendment was introduced to counteract the underutili77. 96 A.D.2d at 775, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 827. The extent to which section 228(e) of
the City Charter does in fact support Executive Order No. 53 is considered at infra
note 208 and accompanying text.
78. 96 A.D.2d at 776, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 828. See infra notes 221, 243 and accompanying text.

79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6735 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (Supp. V 1981).
81. Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12, 15 and 42 U.S.C.).

82. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (Supp. V 1981). See, e.g., Note, The Minority Business Enterprise Set Aside: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1223
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zation of minority businesses in government contracting and was
intended to provide minority business with a "fair share of the
action." ' 3 The set-aside conditioned the receipt of grants for local
public works projects upon the grantee's assurance that at least ten
percent of the amount of the grant would be spent on contracts with
MBEs. 84 The statute defined an MBE as a business at least fifty
percent of which is owned by minority group members.8 5 The statute
further defined minority group members as United States citizens who
are "Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and
Aleuts."

8

The constitutionality of the MBE set-aside was upheld by the Supreme Court in Fullilove v. Klutznick. 87 In sustaining the set-aside,

(1979); Note, The Public Works Employment Act of 1977 and Minority Contracting,
28 CATH. U.L. REV. 121 (1978). For a comprehensive list of lower court decisions
considering the validity of the MBE set-aside, see Comment, FederalEfforts to Assist
Minority Construction Contractors: The Need for Comprehensive Planning, 14
U.C.D. L. REV. 125, 143 n.76 (1980).
83. 123 Cong. Rec. 5327 (1977) (statement of Rep. M/litchell). According to
Representative Parren Mitchell, the amendment's sponsor, minority businesses received annually only one percent of all government contracts. Id. The reasons offered
by proponents in support of the MBE set-aside are summarized in Levinson, supra
note 1, at 75 n.89.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (Supp. V 1981). The full text of the statute, the
accompanying rules and regulations, the record of the congressional debate and
additional legislative history are set out in appendices to Associated Gen. Contractors
of Cal. v. Secretary of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955, 972-1043 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (Supp. V 1981). If the business is publicly owned, then
51 percent of its stock must be owned by minority group members. Id.
86. Id. The Act's definition of minority group members has been criticized as too
broad. According to this view, in the absence of a requirement of a specific showing
of past discrimination, some minorities who have in fact not been excluded because
of discrimination will receive a windfall. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 534-38
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling, local contractors'
associations had challenged the MBE set-aside in federal district courts with mixed
results. Although motions for injunctive relief were usually denied, such denials did
not necessarily imply approval of the set-aside. Compare Carolinas Branch, Associated Cen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Kreps, 442 F. Supp. 392, 400 (D.S.C. 1977)
(even though reasonably possible that plaintiff would succeed on merits because of
judicial aversion to invidious racial quotas, potential harm to public as consequence
of halting project precludes issuance of preliminary injunction) with Montana Contractors' Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 439 F. Supp. 1331, 1335 (D. Mont. 1977)
(contractors failed to establish likelihood of prevailing on merits). Some courts that
addressed the constitutionality of the set-aside upheld its validity, while others ruled
it to be unconstitutional as applied. Compare Rhode Island Chapter, Associated
Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338, 349 (D.R.I. 1978) (equal
protection guarantee satisfied because classification is "benign in fact, justified by the
compelling interest of remedying inequality pursuant to a congressional finding of
past discrimination and closely tailored to achieve its purpose") with Wright Farms
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the Court produced different rationales in three separate opinions,
none of which was signed by more than three justices. In one opinion,
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and Powell, employed a
two-step analysis. First, the Chief Justice determined that the objectives of the legislation were within the spending, proprietary and
equal protection powers of Congress.8 8 In the second part of his
inquiry, Chief Justice Burger rejected the contention that, in a remedial context, Congress must act wholly in a color-blind fashion, and
concluded that the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria was a
constitutionally permissible means for achieving the legislation's objectives.89 Moreover, the Chief Justice found that it was not unconstitutional to deprive non-minority firms innocent of any discriminatory
conduct of access to a portion of the federal public works grants as
long as the remedy, namely, the set-aside, was temporary, narrowly
drawn and properly tailored to cure the effects of prior discrimination. 90

Constr., Inc. v. Kreps, 444 F. Supp. 1023, 1027 (D. Vt. 1977) (in absence of finding
of discrimination in state construction industry, conferring of benefits on minorities
violates fifth amendment equal protection guarantee).
88. 448 U.S. at 473. Chief Justice Burger pointed out that Congressional spending power had frequently been employed in the past "to further broad policy objectives by conditioning the receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient
with statutory and administrative directives." Id. at 474. The Chief Justice prefaced
his analysis with an extensive discussion of the background of the bill and of other
government programs to aid minority businesses in order to show that Congress had
given sufficient consideration to the objectives of the set-aside. Id. at 453-67. The
Chief Justice observed that although the PWEA did not make any specific findings
that past discrimination had prevented minority businesses from effectively participating in government procurement, Congress did have sufficient evidence before it of
a pattern of discrimination. Id. at 478. Under the circumstances, Congress had a
reasonable basis for determining that the set-aside was an appropriate measure to
ensure equal opportunity by eliminating the barriers to minority business access to
federal grants generated by the Act. Id.
89. Id. at 482. The Chief Justice stressed that Congress was endowed with broad
remedial powers to enforce equal protection guarantees, id. at 483-84, and that
deference should be given to Congress in its choice of means to perform a function
within its power. Id. at 480.
90. Id. at 484. According to Chief Justice Burger, the regulatory scheme implementing the set-aside, which included provisions for administrative scrutiny to limit
participation to bona fide MBEs as well as for waiver of the requirement where
compliance was not feasible, ensured that application of the set-aside would be
limited to the remedial objectives set by Congress. Id. at 487-89. Justice Stevens
disagreed with the Court's holding on this point. In his view, the set-aside was
unconstitutional because it raised too many unanswered questions to be characterized as "narrowly tailored." Id. at 541 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
criticized the legislation in particular for failing to justify the ten percent figure and
the choice of the minorities to whom the preference would apply. Id. at 535-36. In
the other dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, emphati-
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Justice Powell, in a separate opinion, applied a modified version of
the strict scrutiny standard used in his opinion in Regents of the
University of Californiav. Bakke, according to which a racial classification is constitutionally permissible only if it is a reasonable means of
advancing a compelling government interest.'11 Justice Powell identified the government's interest as remedying the effects of past discrimination. Since Congress was a competent governmental body for responding to identified discrimination and had made a finding of
illegal discrimination, the government's interest could properly be
characterized as compelling. 92 Justice Powell then tested the MBE setaside to determine if it was an "equitable and reasonably necessary"
means to redress past discrimination." The MBE set-aside passed this
test, inasmuch as it was temporary, set at a reasonable figure, contained a waiver provision, and had only a limited and widely dis94
persed effect on innocent third parties.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, also
wrote separately to demonstrate that the MBE set-aside withstood
scrutiny under the intermediate test which they had articulated, along
with Justice White, in Bakke.9 5 In Justice Marshall's view, the proper
inquiry for racial classifications that provide benefits to minorities to
remedy the present effects of past discrimination is whether they
"serve important governmental objectives and are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. "9 Justice Marshall concluded that the MBE set-aside clearly passed this test,97 and welcomed

cally rejected racially-based preferences as violating the absolute prohibition of the
equal protection guarantee against invidious discrimination toward persons of any
color. Id. at 522-26 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
91. 448 U.S. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring). The traditional formulation of tie
strict scrutiny standard, which Justice Powell applied in Bakke to invalidate the
special admissions program, is that the means must be necessary for advancing a
compelling government interest. See 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978). Although Justice
Powell joined with Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice
Rehnquist in holding that the program was illegal, he did not rule out the use of race
as a factor to be considered in determining an applicant's eligibility for admission.
438 U.S. at 319-21. On this point he was joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall
and Blackmun.
92. 448 U.S. at 497-506. Justice Powell's conclusion was based on an independent
review of congressional power and the legislative history of the MBE provision. Id.
93. Id. at 509-10.
94. Id. at 513-15.
95. 438 U.S. 265, 357-69 (1978)(Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
96. 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 519-21.
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the set-aside as a step in the direction of providing for more meaningful equality of opportunity.9 8
Given the divergence of rationales and the fact that the decision
dealt with only one specific program, it is difficult to determine the
precedential value of Fullilove v. Klutznick. 9 Nevertheless, the decision does endorse the use of benign racial classifications under certain
circumstances. Subsequent discussions of preferential treatment have
concentrated on enumerating these circumstances and determining
whether they are present. 0 0
B. Section 8(a) of the Small Business Administration Act
The use of economic and social criteria in Executive Order No. 53
was foreshadowed by the MBE set-aside developed by the Small
Business Administration (SBA). To facilitate the participation by
small businesses in government contracts, section 8(a) of the Small
Business Administration Act of 1953 authorized the SBA to secure
contracts for government procurement agencies for the purpose of
subcontracting them to small businesses.' 0' Acting without explicit
statutory authority, the SBA interpreted its mandate as being to aid
minority small businesses. 0 2 Accordingly, in awarding subcontracts
under the section 8(a) program, the SBA limited eligibility to small
businesses "owned or destined to be owned by socially or economically
disadvantaged persons.' 10 3 As implemented by the SBA, section 8(a)
functioned as an MBE set-aside because "socially or economically
disadvantaged" was interpreted to include, although not be restricted
to, "Black Americans, American Indians, Spanish Americans, Orien04
tal Americans, Eskimos and Aleuts.'

98. Id. at 522.
99. See Levinson, supra note 1, at 77 n.97.
100. The implications of Fullilove v. Klutznick for determining the appropriate
standard of review of benign racial classifications are examined infra at notes 157-61
and accompanying text.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (Supp. V 1981). A detailed history of the section 8(a)
program may be found in Levinson, supra note 1, at 64-73.
102. Levinson, supra note 1, a! 64.
103. 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-1(c) (1970), reprinted in Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc.
v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696, 702 n.5 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974).
104. Id. These are the same six categories included in the MBE provision of the
PWEA of 1977. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. In 1975, the New York
Legislature enacted two similarly-numbered "minority business concerns" set-asides
closely patterned after the SBA set-aside. See N.Y. Pun. Auri. LAW, §§ 1695-1699a
(McKinney 1981) (Small Business Concerns Set-Aside Purchases and Contracts for
Property and Services at the Hostos Community College); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW, §§
1695-1699a (McKinney 1981) (Small Business Concerns Set-Aside Purchases and

722
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The SBA's conversion of the section 8(a) program into an MBE set05
aside was upheld in Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe.1
Rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the section 8(a) program was
unauthorized because it was not mentioned in the statute, the court
observed that it was not unusual for Congress to formulate its policy in
general terms when dealing with complex issues. 06 The real issue was
whether the SBA had abused its discretion in implementing the section
8(a) program. 0 7 The court held that there had been no abuse. Given
the disproportionately low number of government procurement contracts awarded in the past to small business concerns owned by disadvantaged persons, it was reasonable, and thus consistent with the
statutory policy, for the SBA to make a special effort to correct the
imbalance." 8 Moreover, the court held, the program developed was a
reasonable means for attaining this goal. 0 o9 The court also dismissed
the plaintiff's argument that the set-aside violated federal competitive
bidding requirements. 110 However, because the plaintiffs lacked
standing, the court did not consider whether the use of racial or ethnic

Contracts for Property and Services at the Bronx Community College). A similar
program was enacted by the 1983 Legislature. See N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAW, §§ 1699m1699r (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984) (Small Business Concerns Set-Aside Purchases
and Contracts for Property and Services at Medgar Evers College, City University of
New York). These programs, which have been limited in scope and duration, have
not been challenged in the courts.
105. 477 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974). Plaintiffs,
small businesses who had in the past successfully bid for a refuse hauling contract at
an Air Force base under the section 8(a) program, sought an injunction to prevent the
SBA from setting aside the contract for a black-owned business pursuant to the
regulations providing for assistance to small business concerns owned by disadvantaged persons. Id. at 699-700.
106. Id. at 703.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 704. As additional authority, the court pointed to the provision in the
1967 amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2901 (1973) (repealed 1974), directing the SBA to pay special attention to aiding small businesses
located in areas with a high proportion of unemployed or low-income individuals or
owned by low-income individuals, and to a series of presidential mandates (Executive Orders No. 11,458, 11,511, and 11,625) directing federal departments to establish programs to encourage minority-owned businesses. 477 F.2d at 705-06.
109. 477 F.2d at 705. In Duke City Lumber Co. v. Butz, 382 F. Supp. 362
(D.D.C. 1974), aff'd in part, 539 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1039 (1977), the court upheld an SBA set-aside for small lumber businesses that came
into operation only when timber purchases by the businesses fell more than ten
percent below their historic share of the market. Since the program was reasonable in
substance and in its adoption, the court concluded that the SBA administrator had
acted within the scope of his statutory authority. Id. at 371-72.
110. Ray Baillie, 477 F.2d at 708-09. See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
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origin as the primary criterion for eligibility rendered the program
11
unconstitutional.
The SBA set-aside policy received a statutory basis in 1978 when
Congress enacted Amendments to the Small Business Investment Act
of 1958, which included reforms of the section 8(a) program. 12 Under
the revised program, eligibility is determined in terms of both social
and economic disadvantage. To qualify, applicants must first demonstrate that they are socially disadvantaged as a result of being "subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias because of their
identity as a member of a group."' 1 3 Applicants must then show that
they are economically disadvantaged by demonstrating that their impaired ability to compete in the marketplace is "due to diminished
capital and credit opportunities." ' 4 Thus, while racial classification
still serves as an important criterion, it does not guarantee participation in the program because economic disadvantage must also be
demonstrated.
The constitutionality of the new section 8(a) program has not been
tested in the courts, but it is probable that it would be upheld. Like
the MBE set-aside approved in Fullilove v. Klutznick, the new program is congressionally mandated and based on the same general
findings of discrimination." 5 Moreover, its use of a set-aside is poten-

111. 477 F.2d at 709-10. The court noted not only that plaintiffs had never
applied for participation in the section 8(a) program, but also that they were not

eligible to participate and thus would not be directly affected by the outcome of the
litigation. Id. at 710.
112. Pub. L. No. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757-73 (1978)(codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.). The congressional action came in response to investigations which had

revealed numerous inefficiencies and abuses in the administration of the program. In
particular, the reforms sought to eliminate the proliferation of "fronts" representing

non-minority owners and to alleviate dissatisfaction with the racial criteria employed
by establishing new, more objective criteria for participation. See Levinson, supra

note 1, at 68-70.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981). Socially disadvantaged persons were
presumed to include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, or
members of other minorities. Id. § 637(a)(1)(C). Regulations promulgated to implement the new program set forth procedures for adding to the list of designated groups
and outlined the factors to be considered in determining whether individuals not
members of designated groups were socially disadvantaged. 13 C.F.R. § 124.11(c)(3)(iii) (1983).

114. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6) (Supp. V 1981). As an additional safeguard against
abuse, the statute provides that the individual's assets and net worth are to be
examined, id., and that a qualifying small business concern must be at least 51
percent owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individ-

uals. Id. § 637(a)(4). The latter requirement had also been incorporated into the
PWEA of 1977. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.

115. 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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tially more equitable, since eligibility is based not only on racial and
ethnic classification, but also on economic considerations. 1 6 In this
respect, the section 8(a) program could very well be the model for
future affirmative action programs." 7 Executive Order No. 53 has
gone even further in attempting to neutralize the potentially adverse
consequences of racial classification by eliminating race and ethnicity
as explicit factors in determining eligibility."I8
C. Locally Based Preferential Treatment: The Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968
The third type of federal program which influenced the development of the LBE set-aside was the residency preference enacted as
part of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968.119 Section 3
of the Act attempted to increase employment opportunities for lower
income persons. The section provided that contracts for work to be
performed in connection with HUD-assisted housing and urban development projects "to the greatest extent feasible . . .be awarded to
business concerns . . .which are located in or owned in substantial
120
part by persons residing in the area of such project[s].'
The vagueness of the statutory language in section 3 appears to
leave implementation of the preference entirely to administrative discretion. Nevertheless, in Ramirez, Leal and Co. v. City Demonstration Agency, 12 ' the term "to the greatest extent feasible" was construed as meaning the "maximum" and thus obligated a city agency
"to take every [proper] affirmative action" to make an award to a

116. In the opinion of one commentator, the real problem presented by the section
8(a) program is not its constitutional validity, but rather the administrative implementation of the program, which has failed to meet the statutory goals. See Drabkin,
Minority Enterprise Development and the Small Business Administration's Section
8(a) Program:ConstitutionalBasis and Regulatory Implementation, 49 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 433, 443-57 (1983)(examining efforts to eliminate abuses through introduction
of new regulations limiting participation in program to a fixed term).
117. See id. at 442-43.
118. See infra notes 169-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of
the change in criteria on determining the validity of the LBE preference.
119. Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968)(codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12, 15 and 42 U.S.C.).
120. 12 U.S.C. § 1701u (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The statute directed the Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development to consult with the Administrator of the Small
Business Administration when making such awards and also contained a provision
that opportunities for training and employment related to the construction and
operation of the housing be given to persons of low income residing in the area. Id.
121. 549 F.2d 97 (9th Cir. 1976).

1984]

LBE SET-ASIDE

business meeting the statutory qualifications.' 2 2 The main issue in
Ramirez was not the validity of the preference itself, but whether the
preference was applicable to a contract to audit the books of various
programs funded by the Model Cities Project.' 2 3 The court examined
the legislative history of section 3 of the Housing and Urban Development Act and found that extending the application of the preference
improved the quality of life in underprivileged areas and thus was
24
consistent with the purpose of the typical HUD-assisted program.1
The constitutionality of a similar provision in the Indiana Housing
Finance Authority Act 25 creating local employment and contracting
preferences was upheld in Steup v. Indiana Housing FinanceAuthority. 126 The court found that these preferences complied with the equal
protection guarantees of both the federal and state constitutions because neither involved a suspect classification nor imposed an unfair
or impractical burden. 27 The court also held that the preferences bore
a fair and substantial relation to the statutory purpose of providing
adequate, affordable housing to low and moderate income persons. 2
Not all residency-based preferences have met with judicial approval. In New York, a state-wide program granting an employment
preference to state residents on state-financed projects 29 has been
struck down.130 The statute was held to violate the privileges and
122. Id. at 105. Regulations subsequently issued by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development phrased the requirement in terms of a "good faith effort."
24 C.F.R. § 135.60 (1983).
123. 549 F.2d at 100. The Model Cities program provided for federal assistance to
enable cities "to plan, develop, and conduct programs to improve their physical
environment, increase their supply of adequate housing. . . and provide educational
and social services vital to health and welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976).
124. Ramirez, 549 F.2d at 102. "The program will have greater beneficial effect if
the money spent on the program goes to persons and firms in the area, and is recycled
in the area, and so boosts the local economy." Id.
125. IND. CODE ANN. § 5-20-1-5 (Burns 1983).
126. -Ind.-, 402 N.E.2d 1215 (1980).
127. Id. at -, 402 N.E.2d at 1223-25. Citing Ramirez, Leal & Co. v. City
Demonstration Agency, the court interpreted "to the extent feasible" as requiring
every positive approach that could properly be taken to award contracts to local
firms and to employ low income persons, but held that the phrase fell far short of
imposing a mandatory quota. Id. at -, 402 N.E.2d at 1224.
128. Id. at -, 402 N.E.2d at 1225. The court identified at least two distinct ways
in which the statutory purpose was served: (1) the improvement of economic conditions in the rieighborhood promoted the stability of low and moderate income housing; and (2) resident participation is more apt to foster responsibility and pride than
remote bureaucratic control, and thus improve the quality of the project. Id.
129. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 222 (McKinney 1965) (repealed 1982).
130. Salla v. County of Monroe, 64 A.D.2d 437, 443-44, 409 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907
(4th Dep't 1978), aff'd, 48 N.Y.2d 514, 399 N.E.2d 909, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878, cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1979).
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immunities clause of the United States Constitution because it did not
bear a substantial relationship to the alleviation of unemployment in
New York.131 It also was held to be improper protectionism in viola132
tion of the commerce clause.
A residency requirement itself, however, is not necessarily invalid.
In White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employees, 33 the
Supreme Court upheld an executive order issued by the mayor of
Boston directing that city-funded construction projects be performed
34
by a workforce composed of at least fifty percent Boston residents.1
The Court concluded that to the extent that the city is spending its
own funds on the construction contracts, it is participating in the
marketplace rather than regulating it, and thus is not subject to the
35
commerce clause. 1
The rationale of White appears to support the locally-based aspect
of the LBE preference. 3 Executive Order No. 53 also involves the
expenditure of city funds,' 37 making New York City a participant in
the market rather than a regulator of the market. Moreover, the LBE
preference is clearly distinguishable from the invalidated New York
state residency preference. First, the LBE preference, unlike the plan
outlined in Labor Law section 222, is not a bar to non-residents, since
the requirement can be satisfied by out-of-state contractors employing
out-of-state residents provided they engage in a minimum amount of
business in economic development areas and do not exceed the fixed
income limits.11 Second, the relationship to a legitimate government
purpose is more readily discernible in the case of Executive Order No.
53 than it was with respect to Labor Law section 222, because the
LBE preference is consistent with the declared goal of improving
conditions in economically disadvantaged areas. " The relationship
between the governmental objective and the means employed to

131. Id.
132. Id. at 444-45, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 908.
133. 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983).
134. Id. at 1048. The executive order also included a 25 percent set-aside for
minorities and a ten percent set-aside for women, neither of which were challenged.
Id. at 1043 n.l.
135. Id. at 1048.
136. The Subcontractors Trade Association court did not specifically address the
locally-based aspect of the LBE preference, since Executive Order No. 53 had been
challenged in its entirety as exceeding mayoral authority. See supra note 66 and
accompanying text.
137. Exec. Order No. 53, 108 THE CITY RECORD 2275 (Aug. 22, 1980).
138. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
139. A similar goal was articulated to justify the residency preference in HUDassisted projects. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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achieve it not only ensures that the assistance offered by Executive
Order No. 53 will be directed to areas where it is needed; it also plays
a crucial role in enabling the order to survive an equal protection
challenge.
V. The Constitutionality of Executive Order No. 53: Meeting the
Equal Protection Challenge
In keeping with the city's announced policy of avoiding racially based
affirmative action, 40 Executive Order No. 53 refrains from using
language that might suggest the imposition of a quota. Nevertheless,
the LBE set-aside clearly involves a classification. By setting aside ten
percent of the city's construction contracts for those who qualify as
LBEs,14 1 it has the effect of denying the same benefit to an equal
percentage of contractors who are not members of this class., 42 Unless
this classification can withstand judicial scrutiny, it must be deemed a
violation of equal protection.
A. Determining the Appropriate Standard of Review for
Preferential Treatment
While recognizing that the government may classify people and activities to promote the general welfare, the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection requires that all persons similarly situated be treated
alike. 143 Traditionally, courts have employed a two-tiered approach in

140. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
141. Exec. Order No. 53, §§ 3-4, 108 THE CITY RECORD 2275-76 (Aug. 22, 1980).
142. See Wright Farms Constr., Inc. v. Kreps, 444 F. Supp. 1023, 1032 (D. Vt.
1977) (dismissing as illusory the distinction between numerical goals, supposedly less
permanent, and quotas). See also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289
(Powell, J.) (whether designation of 16 special admissions seats is described as quota
or goal, it is a line drawn on basis of race and ethnic status).
143. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1961)(upholding Sunday
closing law); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 67 (1911)(upholding New York statute regulating sale of spring water); Myer v. Myer, 271 A.D. 465,
472, 66 N.Y.S.2d 83, 90 (1st Dep't 1946), alf'd, 296 N.Y. 979, 73 N.E.2d 562
(1947)(upholding statute requiring that shareholder suing on behalf of corporation to
have been stockholder at time of challenged transaction).
In light of the holding by the New York Court of Appeals that the scope of the
equal protection clause of the state constitution (Art. I, § 11) is coextensive with that
of the federal constitution (fourteenth amendment), see Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town
Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 530, 87 N.E.2d 541, 548 (1949), the two guarantees have been
treated in this Note as being equivalent. The court in Subcontractors Trade Association (as well as in Broidrick v. Lindsay and Fullilove v. Bearne) in effect also treated
them as co-extensive since it did not specify whether it was referring to federal or
state guarantees of equal protection.
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reviewing equal protection challenges, depending on the type of classification involved. In the area of economics and social welfare, the
validity of the classification has been determined by the rational basis
test. According to this test, the classification will be upheld if it is
reasonably related to a proper governmental objective.' 44 Strict scrutiny, on the other hand, is applied in cases involving suspect classifications'4 5 or important constitutional rights.

4

Strict scrutiny analysis is

two-fold: (1) the governmental objective in making the classification
must serve a compelling governmental interest and (2) the means of
accomplishing that objective must be necessary and the least discrimi47
natory available. 1
This two-tiered approach to equal protection analysis has been
vigorously criticized for being rigid and outcome-determinative. 4
Application of the strict scrutiny test almost invariably leads to invalidation of the statute under review. 149 The rational basis test, in contrast, is so broad that it allows a statute to be upheld upon the
articulation of any reasonable basis for its enactment. 5 0 Dissatisfaction with the inflexibility of the two-tiered approach to equal protection analysis has led to the development of a third, intermediate level
of scrutiny. Under this intermediate level test, the classification must

144. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1970)(upholding
Maryland regulation limiting maximum grant available Linder Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program); In re Buttonow, 23 N.Y.2d 385, 392, 244 N.E.2d
677, 681, 297 N.Y.S.2d 97, 103 (1968)(affirming right of mentally ill persons converted from involuntary to voluntary status to judicial review of their retention);
Bauch v. City of New York, 54 Misc. 2d 343, 349-50, 282 N.Y.S.2d 816, 823 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1967), afJ'd, 21 N.Y.2d 599, 237 N.E.2d 211, 289 N.Y.S.2d 951
(1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 834 (1977)(upholding mayoral executive order granting exclusive dues check-off privileges to municipal employees' union).
145. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (race); Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973) (alienage).
146. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335-41 (1972) (voting); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)(interstate travel).
147. See, e.g., Carolinas Branch, Associated Cen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v.

Kreps, 442 F. Supp. 392, 398-99 (D. S.C. 1977).
148. See Note, Minority Business Enterprise Set-Aside: The Reverse Discrinination Challenge, 45 ALB. L. REv. 1139, 1145-46 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Reverse
DiscriminationChallenge].
149. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1000-01 (1978). The only
examples of explicitly racial discriminatory classifications that have survived strict
scrutiny are two World War II cases involving exclusion and curfew orders directed
against citizens of Japanese descent living on the Pacific Coast. See KoreInatsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1944).
150. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (statutory classification
"will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it").

1984]

LBE SET-ASIDE

be substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental objective. '51
As a result of the correlation between the standard of review and
the final result of the review, the selection of the appropriate standard
for evaluating racially or ethnically based preferential treatment is
particularly important. Because the rational basis test has traditionally been applied only to economic and social classifications, it is
clearly inappropriate where a racial classification, including a benign
one, is challenged. 52 The need to subject even benign racial classifications to heightened scrutiny, however, does not automatically lead to
their invalidation. 1 53 Nor does it necessarily mean that strict scrutiny
should be employed.' 54 The intermediate standard has been considered by some courts as particularly well-suited for reverse discrimination cases, since it ensures that the affirmative action plan will be
carefully reviewed while taking into account the intended beneficial
55
impact of the plan.
The intermediate level test, however, has never been adopted by
the Supreme Court in a reverse discrimination case. 5 6 Although the
151. The intermediate level test is usually applied to cases involving gender discrimination. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)(invalidating Oklahoma statute prohibiting sale of 3.2% beer to males under age of 21 and to females
under age of 18). See Note, Reverse Discrimination Challenge, supra note 148, at
1147-48.
152. Although benign racial classifications are essentially remedial in nature, they
may nevertheless have adverse consequences. For instance, a benign racial classification could conceal an invidious purpose, stigmatize a preferred minority group by
belittling its achievements and perpetuating misconceptions about race, intelligence
and ability, discourage minorities from being able to compete on an equal basis by
lowering competitive standards, or, finally, be detrimental to non-minority individuals. Constructors Ass'n of W. Pa. v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 936, 950 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
153. Id. at 950. The court applied the "strict scrutiny" standard to the MBE setaside, finding that it served a compelling governmental interest and was the least
discriminatory means for accomplishing that objective. Id. at 950-54.
154. See, e.g., Rhode Island Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc.
v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338, 357 (D. R.I. 1978)(scrutiny of the means adopted need
not be as strict in case of benign racial classification as that required in case of
invidious racial classification).
155. See Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 509-10 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1124 (1981) (court applied intermediate level test to uphold preferential hiring
program for minority teachers). While acknowledging that racial preferences must
be subjected to a searching examination, the court explained its choice of the intermediate level test in terms of its reluctance "to discourage states from acting voluntarily to remedy past racial discrimination." Id. at 509.
156. The intermediate level test was first applied to affirmative action programs
by Justice Brennan in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at
357-78. This application of the test, however, has never received the support of more
than four justices. See generally, Choper, The Constitutionality of Affirmative
Action: Views from the Supreme Court, 70 Ky. L.J. 1 (1981-82).
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use of a benign racial classification was upheld by the Court in
Fullilove v. Klutznick,157 no clear guidelines were established regarding the appropriate level of equal protection scrutiny to be applied.
Three of the justices upholding the MBE set-aside in that case used the
intermediate level test. 158 Justice Powell, in his concurrence, found
that the MBE set-aside was able to survive strict judicial scrutiny. 15
Chief Justice Burger, however, explicitly refused to apply either the
strict scrutiny or intermediate level standard, though he indicated
that the MBE set-aside could satisfy both standards. 1 0 In cases decided after Fullilove v. Klutznick, federal courts have continued to
employ both standards of scrutiny in reviewing challenges to affirmative action programs."6
The highest state court in New York, however, has resolved the
question of the appropriate standard of review in reverse discrimination cases. In Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 6 2 the petitioner
challenged the constitutionality of the medical school's affirmative
action program after being denied admission on the basis that his
credentials were superior to those of minority students who had been
accepted under the program. 6 3 The court, after reviewing the traditional two-tiered approach to equal protection analysis, 64 rejected the
rational basis and strict scrutiny tests as "polarized and outcomedeterminative.' 6 5 The court opted instead for the intermediate level
test and held that reverse discrimination is constitutional where it is
shown that "a substantial [governmental] interest underlies the policy

157. See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
158. 448 U.S. at 517 (opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Brennan & Blackmun,
JJ.). See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
159. 448 U.S. at 496-510. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
160. 448 U.S. at 491-92. Justice White, who had been the fourth member of the
dissent in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324, which would have applied the intermediate level of
scrutiny to uphold the special admissions program, joined the Chief Justice's opinion.
448 U.S. at 453.
161. Compare South Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v.
Metropolitan Dade County, Fla., 552 F. Supp. 909, 933 (S.D. Fla. 1982)(interpreting recent cases as indicating evolving doctrine that benign racial classifications are
to be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny; 100% set-aside of specified county contracts
for black contractors invalidated, but set-aside of specified percentage of dollar
amount of contracts upheld) with Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F. Supp.
1195, 1202 (E.D. Mich. 1982)(affirmative action layoff provisions designed to retain
sufficient minority teachers to approximate racial composition of student body met
"substantially related" test).
162. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976).
163. Id. at 328, 348 N.E.2d at 540, 384 N.Y.S. 2d at 85.
164. Id. at 332-33, 348 N.E.2d at 542-44, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 87-88.
165. Id. at 333, 348 N.E.2d at 543, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
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and practice and, further, that no nonracial, or less objectionable
racial classifications will serve the same purpose."1 116 Although the
policy must further some legitimate, articulated governmental purpose, the court noted that the interest "need not be urgent, paramount, or compelling. ' 16 7 Rather, the substantial interest requirement would be satisfied where the gain to be derived from the
preferential policy is found to outweigh its possible detrimental ef16 8
fects.
B. Evaluating the LBE Set-Aside
Although the Appellate Division in Subcontractors Trade Association struck down Executive Order No. 53 as an unconstitutional
quota, it did not indicate which, if any, standard of equal protection
analysis it had applied. 169 Since eligibility for participation in the LBE

166. Id. at 336-37, 348 N.E.2d at 546, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90. The court recognized
that because the preferential treatment may encourage polarization of the races and
perpetuate thinking in racial terms, it should be subjected to more careful scrutiny
than that ordinarily entailed by the rational basis test. Id. at 335-36, 348 N.E.2d at
545, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 89-90. On the other hand, the court rejected the application of
the strict scrutiny test to benign discrimination as contrary to the purpose of the
fourteenth amendment: "[i]t would indeed be ironic and, of course, would cut
against the very grain of the amendment, were the equal protection clause used to
strike down measures designed to achieve real equality for persons whom it was
intended to aid." Id. at 334-35, 348 N.E.2d at 544-45, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
167. Id. at 336, 348 N.E.2d at 545, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
168. Id. The court conceded that petitioner had established that the medical
school practiced reverse discrimination, but did not proceed any further in the
inquiry because the petitioner, due to his position on the priority list, had failed to
show his own right to relief, since there was no evidence he would have been
admitted had the entire minority program been eliminated. Id. at 337-38, 348
N.E.2d at 547, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
The intermediate level test has also been used in New York to examine a classification based on the legitimacy of one's birth, see In re Burns, 55 N.Y.2d 501, 507, 435
N.E.2d 390, 393, 450 N.Y.S.2d 173, 176 (1982), and to review the constitutionality
of financing elementary and secondary public school education based on local real
property wealth. See Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist., v. Nyquist,
83 A.D.2d 217, 240, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843, 857 (2d Dep't 1981), modified, 57 N.Y.2d 27,
439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982), appeal dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 775 (1983).
169. 96 A.D.2d at 775, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 827. The opinions in Broidrick v. Lindsay
and Fullilove v. Beame were also silent as to the level of scrutiny employed. See supra
note 134. In each of these cases, as well as in Subcontractors Trade Association, the
statement that the dismissal of the executive orders was unconstitutional was made in
dictum; the central holding was that the particular affirmative action programs
exceeded mayoral power. Assuming, however, that the mayor does have the power to
initiate such programs, see infra notes 185-211 and accompanying text, the equal
protection issue would then require a more detailed analysis. Moreover, the fact that
the courts addressed the equal protection challenge, even though it was not necessary
to their holdings, indicates their awareness of the importance of the issue.
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set-aside is determined by economic and social criteria, no suspect
classification is involved. Thus, heightened scrutiny does not appear
to be necessary. In the area of socio-economic welfare, government
action must be upheld if it is rationally related to a proper purpose,
even if such action produces some inequalities.1 70 Executive Order No.
53, when analyzed according to the rational basis test, is able to
survive scrutiny. The order's goal of improving the economic viability
of underdeveloped areas 171 is a legitimate governmental objective.
Earmarking a percentage of city construction funds for firms and
workers connected to these underdeveloped areas is reasonably related
to attaining that objective. 7 2 The fact that minorities will be among
the prime beneficiaries of the LBE program, a reality that city author7 3
is not enough by
ities were aware of and apparently welcomed,
74
itself to make the classification suspect.
Although the class of LBEs is not suspect, the prevalence of minority group members within the class and the tendency of the New York
courts to treat all affirmative action programs alike 75 suggest that it
might be appropriate to subject Executive Order No. 53 to heightened
170. See Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 914 (1974). The program before the court was the SBA § 8(a)
set-aside, under which government procurement contracts were awarded to small
businesses owned by "socially or economically disadvantaged persons." See supra
notes 101-04 and accompanying text. The court held that the set-aside was within the
statutory goal of promoting the interests of small business concerns. Given the
disproportionately small number of government procurement contracts received in
the past by small business concerns owned by disadvantaged persons, it was within
the SBA's authority to make a special effort to alleviate this imbalance. 477 F.2d at
703-04.
The rational basis test was also applied to uphold the preference for residents of
low income areas included in the Indiana Housing Finance Authority Act inasmuch
as no suspect classification was involved. Steup v. Indiana Hous. Auth., 402 N.E.2d
at 1222-23. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 51.
172. Although the dissent in Subcontractors Trade Association did not explicitly
refer to the rational basis test, it did emphasize that the LBE program was aimed at
improving the economic viability of deprived areas of the city in order to distinguish
Executive Order No. 53 from the "racial quotas" established pursuant to Executive
Order No. 71. 96 A.D.2d at 775, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 827-28.
While the income limits of the program are likely to exclude some local enterprises
which perhaps merit support, as long as the classification is not arbitrary, mathematical precision is not necessary. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61, 78 (1911); Bucho Holding Co. v. State Rent Comm'n, 11 N.Y.2d 469, 477, 184
N.E.2d 569, 573, 230 N.Y.S.2d 977, 983 (1958).
173. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1980, at A3, col. 3.
174. Fortec Constr. v. Kleppe, 350 F. Supp. 171, 173 (D.D.C. 1972)(even though
in some areas "disadvantaged" is synonymous with "minority," SBA section 8(a) setaside is constitutional, since it is not designed to award contracts on basis of race).
175. See supra note 143.
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scrutiny. Such an analysis highlights the difference between the LBE
set-aside and the minority hiring quotas imposed pursuant to Executive Order No. 71 and removes any lingering doubts concerning the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 53. Moreover, it answers any
objections that might be raised concerning the inadequacy of the
rational basis test due to the possible stigmatizing effect of singling out
76
the socially and economically disadvantaged for special treatment.
Since, therefore, it is desirable to supplement the rational basis test
with a more rigorous examination, the question of which higher
standard to apply must be answered. This question is governed by the
77
holding in Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center.1
If the intermediate
standard of scrutiny is appropriate for evaluating racially based preferential treatment programs, then it is surely appropriate for measuring socially and economically based preferential treatment. The LBE
preference meets this test. Its aim, the revitalization of economically
depressed areas, is certainly a substantial or important governmental
objective, as demonstrated by the numerous government efforts aimed
at achieving this objective. 7 8 Executive Order No. 53 does not make
any specific findings concerning the existence of areas in need of
economic aid. Nevertheless, its adoption of eligibility standards employed by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 79 indicates that the LBE program is not based merely on a
general perception of economic difficulties, but is designed to meet a
concrete, well-documented need.
As articulated in Alevy, employing the intermediate standard also
requires a showing that the substantial government interest cannot be
achieved by a nonracial, or less objectionable, racial means. 8 0 The
means employed to implement the aim of Executive Order No. 53
clearly satisfy this aspect of the test, since the classification involved in
the LBE preference is nonracial. Moreover, the size of the preference,
ten percent, is reasonable and does not impose a particularly onerous
burden on those contractors who do not qualify as LBEs.' 8' Indeed,
unlike a minority-based program, the eligibility standards here are

176. The potentially adverse consequences of racially based affirmative action are
discussed at supra note 152 and accompanying text.
177. 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976).
178. See supra note 1. The importance of the program is also illustrated by the
adverse consequences likely to result from leaving entire segments of the community
outside of the economic and social mainstream. See supra note 152.
179. 1981 Rules and Regulations, supra note 57, § 53.12J.
180. 39 N.Y.2d at 336-37, 348 N.E.2d at 546, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
181. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 513-14 (Powell, J., concurring).
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not absolute. Any contractor meeting the income limits may comply
either by hiring workers from economically disadvantaged areas or
82
conducting more work in those areas.'
Finally, the LBE preference also satisfies the standards for a valid
affirmative action program as set forth in Broidrick v. Lindsay.183 The
LBE preference increases the pool of persons eligible for employment
to the extent that economically disadvantaged persons may have been
excluded from the workforce in the past.184 Equally important, to the
extent that the LBE preference benefits economically underprivileged
persons who are minority group members, it contributes to the remedying of past discrimination without imposing the invidious impediments sometimes associated with racially based affirmative action.
VI. The Authorization for Executive Order No. 53: Reexamining
the Extent of Mayoral Power
Even if Executive Order No. 53 satisfies the equal protection guarantee, it still remains to be established whether the order covers an
area of proper mayoral action. This question may be divided into two
parts: whether the executive branch of government may conduct a
preferential treatment program in the absence of express legislative
authorization; and, if so, whether, in a proper case, there is a separate
grant of power authorizing the executive to undertake such activity.
A. Preferential Treatment by the Executive Branch in the Absence
of Express Legislative Authorization
Although no precise analogy may be drawn between presidential
and mayoral powers, a review of the power of the federal executive
branch to initiate preferential treatment provides a useful model for
analyzing the limits of mayoral power.
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, both the opinion of Chief Justice Burger
and the concurrence of Justice Powell carefully analyzed the power of
Congress to enact legislation combatting discrimination. Both Justices
emphasized that Congress was uniquely situated to act in this area. 185
This emphasis left their opinions open to the interpretation that only
Congress had the authority to utilize race-conscious remedies to cor-

182. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
183. 39 N.Y.2d at 647, 350 N.E.2d at 598, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 268.

184. Id.
185. See supra notes 88 & 92 and accompanying text.
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rect the effects of past discrimination. 186 Yet, neither opinion explicitly
conditioned the validity of the MBE set-aside on Congressional authorization. 87 At a minimum, the governmental body creating an affirmative action program must have the power to do so.' 88 Not every
governmental body will be able to satisfy this requirement.8 9 Nevertheless, the decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick does not foreclose the
possibility of executively-initiated preferential treatment. 9 0

186. See Central Alabama Paving, Inc. v. James, 499 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Ala.
1980), in which the court struck down United States Department of Transportation
regulations setting goals for the participation of minority and women controlled
businesses in highway construction projects. The court held that an administrative
agency seeking to establish a preferential classification must have been given the
authority by Congress to take such action. In addition, the agency must have made
findings of past discrimination and determined that its actions are responsive to that
discrimination. Id. at 636. The Department of Transportation, the court ruled, had
failed to meet either of these requirements. Id. at 638.
187. See M.C. West, Inc. v. Lewis, 522 F. Supp. 338 (M.D. Tenn. 1981), which
upheld the MBE regulations issued by the federal Department of Transportation.
Disagreeing with the court's reading of Fullilove v. Klutznick in Central Alabama
Paving, supra note 186, that only Congress may authorize race conscious remedies,
the M.C. West court noted that the Secretary of Transportation was acting in
response to remedial goals set by Congress and that the President had, through
Executive Order Nos. 11,246 and 11,625, enlisted the aid of federal departments to
promote these congressional goals. 522 F. Supp. at 347. The court also observed that
the findings of Congress regarding the PWEA of 1977 were broad enough to support
ameliorative regulations in the construction industry. Moreover, the court found that
the remedy was narrowly implemented and involved little coercion. Id. at 348.
188. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 498 (Powell, J., concurring). This assumption, although not expressly stated, also underlies Chief Justice Burger's extensive
analysis of Congress' power to enact the MBE set-aside.
189. See Arrington v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc., 403 So. 2d 893
(Ala. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 913 (1982), which invalidated a city ordinance
mandating a ten percent MBE set-aside. The court held that the Birmingham City
Council was not a competent body to identify and address constitutional violations.
Even if it were competent, the court continued, the Fullilove standards had not been
met because the necessary record had not been compiled and the remedy was not
carefully tailored to rectify the continuing effects of past discrimination. Id. at 900.
But see Schmidt v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated
on other grounds, 457 U.S. 594 (1982), which upheld an MBE set-aside established
by a local school board. Since the school board did not have the same constitutional
power as Congress, the court did not automatically extend the results of Fullilove v.
Klutznick. Instead, it subjected the program to separate analysis, and found that the
school board was an appropriate body for asserting an interest in remedying the
effects of past discrimination in the construction industry. Id. at 559. The court also
found the program to be consistent with the demands of equal protection regardless
of which standard was applied. Id. at 559-60.
190. See M.C. West, Inc. v. Lewis, 522 F. Supp. at 343. See generally Note,
Fullilove v. Kluztnick: Do Affirmative Action Plans Require CongressionalAuthorization? 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1315 (1981).
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Since the executive as well as the legislative branches may, in fact,
authorize preferential treatment programs, it is necessary to determine whether executive action in this area infringes upon the powers
of the legislature. The Supreme Court considered the issue of separation of powers in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer.' 9' The
Court in Youngstown invalidated a presidential executive order directing the seizure of steel companies during the Korean War as a
violation of the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches. 9 2 In a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson, noting
that the separation of powers within the federal government was not
intended to be absolute, identified three different situations in which
assertions of presidential power may be challenged:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate ....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can rely upon his own independent
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not
invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility ....
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus
93
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.1
As this scheme makes clear, the extent of executive power in a
particular area will depend on the action, if any, taken by the legislative branch.19 4 The powers of the mayor and the City Council may be

191. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
192. Id. at 587-89. The Court rejected the argument that the order could be
sustained as an exercise of either the President's military power or executive power.
Taking possession of private property was exclusively a matter for Congress, and
Congress' law-making power was subject neither to presidential nor military supervision. Id.
193. Id. at 635-37 (footnote omitted). Justice Jackson placed the order under
consideration in the third category and could find no constitutional provision granting the President an independent power to act in this area so broad as to outweigh
congressional power. Id. at 638-47.
194. Justice Jackson's categorization was utilized in Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v.
Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971), which
upheld the Philadelphia Plan, an affirmative action plan implemented pursuant to
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more circumscribed than those of their federal counterparts.19 5 Yet,
the dynamics of the relationship between the two branches are similar. When the mayor takes specific action, he will be doing so upon
the authorization, explicit or implicit, of the City Council, in opposition to enactments of the City Council, or in the absence of any
expression of the City Council's will in the matter. Accordingly, any
problems concerning assertions of mayoral power will still fall within
one of Justice Jackson's three categories.
With respect to Executive Order No. 53, both the first and third
categories would appear to be inapplicable. The City Council has not
taken any action which either authorizes or prohibits the implementa-

presidential Executive Order No. 11,246. See supra note 17. The court reasoned that
the order did not fall within Justice Jackson's third category, since the general
prohibition against discrimination in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not prevent the
President from taking affirmative action to remedy discrimination in the construction
industry. Id.at 171-73. The court traced the authority for the Plan to the President's
general authority to act for the protection of the federal interest. The court found
that in the case of federally assisted construction projects, such action, if not authorized by Congress, at least fell within Justice Jackson's second category, namely, the
zone of concurrent authority. Id. at 171.
Reference to Justice Jackson's categories was also made in M.C. West, Inc. v.
Lewis, in which the court identified presidential Executive Order No. 11,625, establishing a national program for minority business enterprises, as constituting authority
for the Transportation Secretary's MBE set-aside regulations. 522 F. Supp. at 345-46.
195. The organization of government at the federal and local levels is compared in
LaGuardia v. Smith, 176 Misc. 482, 27 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), af-'d,
262 A.D. 708, 27 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1st Dep't 1941), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 1, 41 N.E.2d 153
(1942). Based on its analysis of the 1936 City Charter, which the court described as a
codification of the current law of the city rather than a constitution, the court
concluded that the charter was an instrument of intermingled, not separate, powers.
Id. at 485-86, 27 N.Y.S.2d at 324-25. Accordingly, the mayor could not claim
immunity from a subpoena issued by a special committee of the City Council
investigating the Municipal Civil Service Commission. Id. at 488-89, 27 N.Y.S.2d at
326-27. The distinction between separate and intermingled powers is more apparent
than real, however, since even at the federal level, the separation of powers is not
absolute. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 442-43 (1977).
The distribution of powers between the executive and legislative branches under
the 1962 Charter remains much the same as that effected by the earlier Charter.
Section 21 of the Charter vests the legislative power in the City Council. N.Y.C.
Charter § 21 (1962). The specific powers of the council, including the adoption and
enforcement of local laws, are enumerated in section 27. Section 3 designates the
mayor as the chief executive officer. The only specific grants of power made in this
section are the power to delegate authority to fulfill mayoral duties and to create
positions within the executive office by means of executive orders. The mayor's
powers are described in general terms in section 8(a), which provides that "[t]he
mayor, subject to this charter, shall exercise all the powers vested in the city, except
as otherwise provided by law." Id. § 8(a). The mayor's powers of appointment are set
forth in sections 6 and 7.
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tion of the LBE program. 96 Rather, Executive Order No. 53 falls
within the second category. Although the City Council also could
have chosen to take action to aid LBEs, its silence regarding the LBE
preference signals neither approval nor disapproval. 9 7 But if the
mayor does have the power to take such action, the overlap of his
power with the powers of the City Council is of little import. For
Justice Jackson's second category posits such a zone of concurrent
authority in which legislative inaction, whatever its cause, enables, if
not invites, independent action by the chief executive."",
B. The Specific Grant of Mayoral Power
While the concept of "concurrent authority" helps explain the relationship between mayoral and legislative powers, it does not eliminate
the need for an inquiry into the specific authorization for a particular
mayoral action. The holding in Subcontractors Trade Association v.
Koch that Executive Order No. 53 exceeded mayoral power ruled out
any need for examining the source of the mayor's authority. 9 9 In
support of this proposition, the Subcontractorscourt cited Broidrick v.
Lindsay and Fullilove v. Beame without undertaking a separate analysis. 200 Yet, the LBE preference created by Executive Order No. 53 is
sufficiently different from the affirmative action program of Executive Order No. 71 to warrant an independent analysis.
In the case of Executive Order No. 53, the authority for the imposition of the LBE program has been traced to the city's power to impose
its requirements on contractors working on its projects. 20 The contracting powers of the city are set forth in section 20 of the General

196. With respect to Executive Order No. 71, in contrast, the objection was raised
that, in addition to exceeding mayoral power, the regulations concerning minority
man-hour percentages and minority apprentice programs violated New York City
Administrative Code § 343-8.0, which prohibits discrimination in employment by
those contracting with the city. Broidrick v. Lindsay, 39 N.Y.2d at 645-47, 350
N.E.2d at 597-98, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 266-68.
197. The policy reasons for rejecting the "ratification by inaction" doctrine are
considered in Note, Doing Good the Wrong Way, supra note 1 at 946 (improperly
shifts burden of acquiring majority from proponents to opponents of the legislation).
198. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 636-37 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). See also Fullilove v. Beame, 48 N.Y.2d at 385, 398 N.E.2d at 770, 423
N.Y.S.2d at 149 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting)("it is recognized that each branch, to
protect its own independence, to some extent may exercise inherent powers that,
strictly speaking, may be thought to belong to another").
199. Subcontractors Trade Ass'n v. Koch, 96 A.D.2d at 775, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
200. Id.
201. Memorandum Opinion at 6-9, Subcontractors Trade Ass'n v. Koch, 96
A.D.2d 774, 465 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1983) (decision of trial court in Subcontractors Trade
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City Law. 20 2 The New York Court of Appeals construed this provision
as evincing a design on the part of the State to provide a city, when
contracting for the purchase of supplies or the hiring of labor, with
full power to fix the terms and conditions upon which it chooses to
203
deal.
The city's contracting power corresponds to the powers enjoyed by
government in general to determine those parties with whom it will
20 4
deal and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will deal.
The city's power to set the terms of its contracts, however, does not by
itself constitute authority for Executive Order No. 53. It still must be
shown that the mayor shares in this power, and that the LBE program
is included within the "terms and conditions" the mayor is empowered to establish.
On the federal level, the government's contracting powers have
been extended to the executive by implicitly including them in that
branch's general enforcement powers. Specifically, the Supreme
Court has held that as long as the executive branch does not contravene any statutory provision, it may freely enter into contracts on
whatever conditions and provisions it deems will best promote the
interests of government.20 5 No New York case has directly addressed
this issue. However, the state Court of Appeals, in reviewing the
authority of the city to determine the manner in which its business

Ass'n v. Koch, reprinted in Record on Appeal). See also dissenting opinion, id. at
827.
202. See N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1983-84). Subdivision (1) of General City Law section 20 empowers every city "[t]o contract and be
contracted with . . ." Subdivision (19) empowers cities "[t]o regulate the manner of
transacting the city's business and affairs ..
" See also General City Law section
23(1), which provides that the powers granted by the law "are to be exercised by the
officer, officers or official body vested with such powers by any other provision of
law or ordinance ......
203. See McMillen v. Browne, 14 N.Y.2d 326, 330, 200 N.E.2d 546, 547-48, 251
N.Y.S.2d 641, 644 (1964)(upholding New York City Administrative Code § 3439.0(a),(e), requiring contractors to pay minimum wage). See also Great Neck Electric, Inc. v. City of New York, N.Y.L.J., March 1, 1984, at 12, col.2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County) (municipality may establish strict terms according to which it will contract).
204. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940)(upholding power of
Secretary of Labor to set minimum wages). See also United States v. New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 436 U.S.
942 (1978)(local public utility with significant sales to United States required to
comply with equal opportunity obligations of presidential Executive Order No.
11,246 even though utility had not expressly agreed to be bound).
205. See Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 116 (1954)(construing
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, § 4(a) & (b), 41 U.S.C. § 154(a) & (b),
Court affirmed power of Department of Navy to negotiate contracts which provide
for private purchasing agents for supplies and materials).
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and affairs are transacted, has held that the mayor is empowered to
act on its behalf.20 6 In addition, it has been held that the mayor,
through his power of enforcement, may act to protect the city's wellbeing by disqualifying certain individuals from participating in city
contracts.2 07 Although these cases do not define the outer limits of the
mayor's powers, they do establish that the mayor may act on the city's
behalf in determining with whom, and on what terms, the city will
transact its business.
Even though the mayor has the power to control the city's relationship with its contractors, the argument may still be raised that the
LBE set-aside is not typical of the "terms or conditions" that appear in
contracts. For example, New York City Charter section 228(e), which
confers on the mayor the power to issue directives and adopt rules and
regulations regarding the execution of capital projects, would appear
to refer primarily to the technical aspects of these projects, such as
arranging financing or approving designs. 20 8 A contract term, however, is not necessarily limited to a narrow technical requirement. As
indicated by the decision in Kayfield v. Morris,2 09 any condition
which affects the city's well-being may properly be considered. 210 The
real limit on the mayor's contracting powers thus appears to be not
whether the term is related to the technical details of the contract, but
whether the term articulates a bona fide city interest. With respect to
the LBE set-aside, improving the viability of economically undevel21
oped areas has been identified as a legitimate city interest.

206. See Bauch v. City of New York, 21 N.Y.2d 599, 605, 237 N.E.2d 211, 213,
289 N.Y.S.2d 951, 953-54 (1968)(upholding mayoral executive order providing for
exclusive union dues check-off on city payroll).
207. Kayfield Constr. Corp. v. Morris, 15 A.D.2d 373, 377, 225 N.Y.S.2d 507,
513 (1st Dep't 1962). The particular action under consideration was a mayoral
executive order listing contractors who had given gifts to city officials and directing
city agencies not to do business with them. Id. at 375, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
208. These technical aspects are spelled out in subdivisions (a) through (d) of the
section, to which subdivision (e) cross-refers. Section 228(e) of the Charter was cited
by the dissent in Subcontractors Trade Association as sufficient authority for the
issuance of Executive Order No. 53. 96 A.D.2d at 775, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 827. No
attempt was made, however, to explore the broader implications of the mayor's
contracting powers.
209. 15 A.D.2d 373, 225 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1st Dep't 1962). See supra note 207 and
accompanying text.
210. The federal government's power to utilize its contracting powers to attain
social goals is well-established. See Morgan, Achieving National Goals Through
Federal Contracts: Giving Form to an UnconstrainedAdministrative Process, 1974
Wis. L. REV. 301.
211. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Whether a similar analysis may
also be used to uphold Executive Order No. 71 remains an open question. On the one
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VII. The Relation of Executive Order No. 53 to State and Local
Competitive Bidding Statutes
Even though Executive Order No. 53 falls within the boundaries of
mayoral power, the mayor, in exercising this power, may not take any
action inconsistent with state law. 212 Thus, Executive Order No. 53
must also be examined in the light of existing state law before a final
determination of its validity may be made.
A. Statutory Obligation to Award Contracts to "Lowest Responsible
Bidder"
In addition to ruling that the LBE set-aside mandated by Executive
Order No. 53 was unconstitutional and exceeded mayoral power, the
Subcontractors Trade Association court held that it violated the competitive bidding provisions of General Municipal Law section 103(1)
and New York City Charter section 343(b), which require that all
public work and purchase contracts above a specified dollar amount
be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder. 21 3 According to this
view, the omission of a specific reference to competitive bidding in

hand, given the mayor's contracting powers, the possibility of including terms setting
minority hiring goals should not be entirely ruled out. On the other hand, since
racially based affirmative action is involved, the weighing of the relevant city interest
may lead to the conclusion that such a program is not one of the contract terms the
mayor is empowered to set. Thus, the change from racial and ethnic to social and
economic criteria not only permits Executive Order No. 53 to survive an equal
protection challenge, but also supports the conclusion that it is within the boundaries
of mayoral power.
212. All actions of the city, whether taken by the legislature or the executive
branch, are subject to this limitation. McMillen v. Browne, 14 N.Y.2d 326, 331, 251
N.Y.S.2d 641, 644 (1964).
213. 96 A.D. at 775, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 827. The court also held that section 9 of
Executive Order No. 53 and 1981 Rules and Regulations § 53.41 conflicted with
General Municipal Law § 103(1) insofar as they relieve LBEs of the necessity of
posting security bonds. Id. A closer look at the relevant statutory and regulatory
language, however, indicates that this particular conflict may be more apparent than
real. To begin with, the statute states that contracts are to be awarded to the "lowest
responsible bidder furnishing the required security...", N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §
103(1) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1983-84), thus suggesting that there is some discretion in establishing what, if any, security is to be required. In addition, under section
9 of Executive Order No. 53, full or partial waivers of performance and completion
bonds are not granted automatically, but must be consistent with the rules and
regulations of the Board of Estimate and are subject to the approval of the Corporation Counsel. Finally, while 1981 Rules and Regulations § 53.41 provides that each
construction contract shall contain a clause to the effect that contractors shall not
require performance and payment bonds for LBE subcontractors, the prime contractors themselves are not relieved of the obligation to post such bonds.
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Executive Order No. 53 and its accompanying rules and regulations,
coupled with the setting of a minimum percentage for LBE participation, is likely to result in the award of a contract to a firm other than
the lowest responsible bidder.21 4 Moreover, this interpretation appears
to regard the provision in Executive Order No. 53 that contract
awards are to be consistent with applicable city, state, and federal
law2 15 as too general to be an adequate safeguard of the competitive
bidding prooess.
The court's deference to competitive bidding in Subcontractors
Trade Association is consistent with an established line of cases that
has sought to preserve the integrity of the competitive bidding process.
Attempts to bypass or subvert the competitive bidding process have
not survived court challenges. 216 In upholding the validity of competitive bidding requirements, the courts have stressed their two-fold
purpose: to obtain the best work and supplies at the lowest possible
price and to guard against favoritism, improvidence, extravagance,
21 7
fraud and corruption.
If the Court of Appeals finds that Executive Order No. 53 permits
the awarding of contracts irrespective of competitive bidding requirements, these policy considerations provide more than sufficient

214. A similar conclusion was reached in Arrington v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 403 So. 2d 893, 898 (Ala. 1981), which struck down a city ordinance mandating
a ten percent MBE set-aside in construction contracts as violating the state's competitive bidding law.
215. Exec. Order No. 53, §§ 3, 4.
216. See, e.g., Albion Industrial Center v. Town of Albion, 62 A.D.2d 478, 405
N.Y.S.2d 521 (4th Dep't 1978) (lease agreement with option to purchase between
individual and city void since not true lease but effort to evade application of
competitive bidding requirements to construction of building); Edenwald Contracting Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 86 Misc. 2d 711, 384 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1974), aff'd, 47 A.D.2d 610, 366 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1st Dep't 1975) (directive
prohibiting night paving contracts with asphalt plants in certain zoning area is
impermissible attempt to design specifications so as to shut out or reduce competitive
bidding).
217. See, e.g., Le Cesse Bros. Contracting, Inc. v. Town Bd., 62 A.D.2d 28, 403
N.Y.S.2d 950, 952 (4th Dep't 1978), aJ'd, 46 N.Y.2d 960, 388 N.E.2d 737, 415
N.Y.S.2d 413 (1979). This policy has been held to be so important that participation
in fraudulent and collusive bidding practices will not only render the contract void,
but will also prevent the offending bidder from recovering in quantum meruit for
any work done before the contract was cancelled. See Jered Contracting Corp. v.
New York City Trans. Auth., 22 N.Y.2d 187, 192-93, 239 N.E.2d 197, 200, 292
N.Y.S.2d 98, 102-03 (1968). See also District Council No. 9 v. Metropolitan Trans.
Auth., 115 Misc. 2d 810, 814-15, 454 N.Y.S.2d 663, 668-69 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1982)(policies supporting competitive bidding run so deeply that even laudable and
worthwhile purpose, such as, in instant case, supporting organization employing exconvicts, will not justify letting without bid a contract covered by competitive
bidding statute).
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ground for its invalidation. But policy arguments may be used to
support as well as to void governmental action. Although unreasonable actions by the authorities that tend to limit the list of qualified
bidders are illegal, 2 18 actions taken in conformance with the goals of
competitive bidding are legal. 219 The majority opinion in Subcontractors Trade Association, by assuming that the implementation of Executive Order No. 53 would, at least in some cases, mean that the
contract would not be let to the lowest responsible bidder, concluded
that Executive Order No. 53 did not conform to the goals of competitive bidding. 22 0 If, however, it can be shown that by complying with
the LBE set-aside a contractor comes within the definition of a "responsible bidder," then rejection of a low bidder not satisfying the
LBE set-aside is consistent with the competitive bidding requirements, since the contractor has not qualified as "responsible."
B. Qualifications of the "Lowest Responsible Bidder"
Had the legislature intended cost to be the sole criterion in determining the letting of contracts, it would have provided merely that
contracts be awarded to the lowest bidder. The inclusion of the term
"responsible" indicates that other factors are to be taken into consideration.2 2 1 The delineation of these factors, however, has been left to the
courts. In a generic sense, a responsible bidder is one who is "accountable" or "reliable. '222 Among the specific attributes found to be in-

218. See, e.g., Caristo Constr. Corp. v. Rubin, 30 Misc. 185, 194, 221 N.Y.S.2d
956, 969 (Kings County), modified on other grounds, 15 A.D.2d 561, 222 N.Y.S.2d
998 (2d Dep't 1961), afj'd, 10 N.Y.2d 538, 180 N.E.2d 794, 225 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1962).
See generally, 10 E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.44 (3rd ed. 1969).
219. Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. New York City Trans. Auth., 79 A.D.2d 14, 2123, 435 N.Y.S.2d 984, 988-89 (2d Dep't 1981)(award of contract to lowest responsible
bidder after post-bid negotiations held not inconsistent with policies underlying
bidding statutes where record contained no suggestion of favoritism, fraud or corruption, competitor was fairly and properly established as lowest responsible bidder and
public interest was advanced by reduction in cost and liquidated damages provision
obtained through negotiations).
220. 96 A.D.2d at 775, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 827.
221. This conclusion is supported not only by a common-sense reading of the text,
but by the well-established rule of statutory construction that meaning and effect is
to be given to all the provisions and language of a statute, including each of its words.
See McKinney's Consol. Laws of New York, Book I, Statutes, § 231 (1971 & Supp.
1983-84), and cases cited therein.
222. Kings Bay Buses, Inc. v. Aiello, 100 Misc.2d 1, 5, 418 N.Y.S.2d 284, 287
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1979). In an early leading case, the term "lowest responsible
bidder" was defined as one "able to respond or to answer in accordance with what is
expected or demanded." People ex rel. Martin v. Dorsheimer, 55 How. Pr. 118, 120
(N.Y. 1878).
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cluded in the term are the financial ability to complete the contract ,223
skill, judgment, and integrity, 224 previous performance of satisfactory
work, 225 and possession of the necessary facilities and equipment for
226
doing the work.
These factors, which are directly related to the performance of the
contract, make it clear that submission of the lowest bid does not
guarantee the award of the contract. 227 No New York court, however,
has had occasion to consider the question whether "lowest responsible
bidder" encompasses "social responsibility." Thus, whether a contractor's contribution to improving the situation of economically and
socially disadvantaged persons through compliance with Executive
Order No. 53, either by qualifying as an LBE or subcontracting with
an LBE, may be made a condition for bidding on city contracts
remains an open question.
Other jurisdictions have, by analogy, answered this question in the
affirmative. In S. N. Nielsen Company v. Public Building Commission of Chicago,2 28 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a "canvassing
formula" under which a bidder receives credits for the percentage of
hours worked by minority members in its workforce. 229 These credits
are then included in the calculations upon which the awarding of the
contract is based. The court found not only that the Public Building
Commission, a municipal corporation, had the statutory authority to
230
insert affirmative action requirements in the letting of its contracts,
but also that a contractor's commitment to affirmative action is
within the meaning of the term responsible because it "may be ex' 231
pected or demanded under the terms of the contract."

223. Syracuse Intercepting Sewer Bd. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 255 N.Y. 288,
294, 174 N.E. 657, 659 (1931).
224. Picone v.City of New York, 176 Misc. 967, 969, 29 N.Y.S.2d 539, 541 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1941).
225. Abco Bus Co., Inc. v.Macchiarola, 75 A.D.2d 831, 832, 427 N.Y.S.2d 876,
878 (2d Dep't 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 52 N.Y.2d 938, 419 N.E.2d 870, 437
N.Y.S.2d 967, cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 107 (1981).
226. Gilmore v. City of Utica, 131 N.Y. 26, 35, 29 N.E. 841, 843 (1892). The
various factors, and the situations in which they are considered, are discussed at
length in Rosenbaum, Criteriafor Awarding Public Contractsto the Lowest Responsible Bidder, 28 CORNELL L. Q. 37, 43-51 (1942).
227. See Rosenbaum, supra note 226, at 40.
228. 81 Ill.
2d 290, 410 N.E.2d 40 (1980).
229. Id. at 296, 410 N.E.2d at 43.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 299, 410 N.E.2d at 44 (quoting People ex rel. Peterson v.Owen, 290
Ill.
59, 67, 124 N.E. 860, 864 (1919)).
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A broad reading of the concept of "responsibility" is also found in
Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College District.132 In rejecting a
challenge to a contract containing affirmative action requirements
imposed pursuant to a Presidential Executive Order, 233 the Ohio Supreme Court relied on both economic and moral arguments to justify
its conclusion that "the capacity to assure a performance which complies with anti-discriminatory laws is reasonably a part of the standard of a best or responsible bidder on a contract involving the
expenditure of public funds. ' 234 Denying the benefits of public contract expenditures to contractors unwilling to adhere to anti-discriminatory guidelines was, in the court's opinion, both cost effective in
comparison with other methods for securing compliance with equal
employment oppcrtunity laws and morally preferable because it did
not place the government in the position of indirectly financing discriminatory employment practices by binding only its direct contrac235
tor and not the entire contract performance.
Although no New York court has directly addressed this issue,
decisions holding that the "moral worth" of the bidder is an appropriate consideration in determining responsibility indicate a willingness
to consider qualifications other than those strictly related to the more
technical aspects of contract performance. 2 6 Taking the character of
the bidder into account is not equivalent to requiring preferential
treatment. Nevertheless, extending the concept of responsibility to
include social responsibility does not necessarily attenuate the compet-

232. 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 38, 249 N.E.2d 907, 910 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1004 (1970).
233. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1981).
234. 19 Ohio St. 2d at 39, 249 N.E.2d at 910.
235. Id.
236. See Abco Bus Co., Inc. v. Macchiarola, 75 A.D.2d 831, 832, 427 N.Y.S.2d
876, 878 (2d Dep't 1980) (moral character, including prior criminal activities, is
valid criterion for determining lowest responsible bidder, but Board of Education
acted arbitrarily in refusing to award contract since it had accepted bids from other
corporations whose principals had criminal records); Picone v. City of New York,
176 Misc. 967, 969, 29 N.Y.S.2d 539, 541 (upholding determination that firm was
not responsible bidder because it was front for individual who had repeatedly come
into conflict with criminal law). See also Great Neck Electric, Inc. v. City of New
York, N.Y.L.J., March 1, 1984, p.12, col.2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County) (low bid rejected
since bidder failed to complete necessary information concerning women and minorities in workforce, as required by Executive Order No. 50, supra note 52; affirming
power of municipality to establish strict terms according to which it will contract,
court noted that Executive Order No. 50 aimed at ensuring that companies that
benefit from government contracts provide employment opportunities on nondiscriminatory basis).

746

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XII

itive bidding process. 237 On the contrary, Executive Order No. 53
establishes an additional qualification for "responsibility. ' 238 Although the regulations could have been more specific concerning the
continued validity of competitive bidding requirements, they do incorporate several provisions designed to preserve competitive bidding
among qualified bidders. 239 Moreover, the mere fact that economically and socially disadvantaged persons may be among the successful
240
bidders is not a basis for assuming that standards will be lowered.
Were the LBE set-aside to result in the awarding of a contract to the
higher of two responsible bidders, it would, of course, violate the
competitive bidding statutes; no such violation occurs where the con-

237. In this respect the LBE set-aside differs significantly from the MBE set-aside
under section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, which allows the SBA to award contracts through private negotiation. Because section 8(a) constitutes specific statutory
authority to dispense with competition and the purpose of the program made competition impractical, the SBA set-aside was upheld as falling within exceptions contained in federal statutes requiring competition in government procurement. Ray
Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696, 708 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 941 (1974). No similar exceptions are contained in General Municipal Law section 103, which authorizes the waiver of competition only in the case of a
public emergency, N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 103(4) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 198384), or under certain, very limited, circumstances, such as the purchase of surplus or
second-hand supplies from a governmental body, id. § 103(6), purchases by municipal hospitals under Public Health Law § 2803-a, id. § 103(8), and purchases by the
board of education of food directly from producers. Id. § 103(9). The statute,
however, does seem to allow for some flexibility with respect to policy considerations.
For example, section 103(1-a) allows for the use of stock item specifications of New
York manufacturers on the bid, in order to promote the public interest by retaining
jobs and attracting new industry to the state.
238. That this was the intended impact of the LBE program is indicated by a
provision in the 1981 Rules and Regulations that failure of a proposed contractor to
furnish information concerning the identity of each LBE to be awarded a subcontract and the dollar amount and percentage of work to be subcontracted will render
that contractor's bid unresponsible. 1981 Rules & Regulations, supra note 57, §
53.42(6). See Central Alabama Paving, Inc. v. James, 499 F. Supp. 629, 633 (1980).

Although the court sustained a constitutional challenge to an MBE program instituted pursuant to Department of Transportation regulations, it rejected the contention that the regulation violated the federal competitive bid statute. The court held
that the Department of Transportation was, through its regulations, merely establishing an additional qualification for responsiveness. Id.
239. The most important provisions, in this respect, are the detailed eligibility
requirements, see 1981 Rules & Regulations, supra note 57, § 53.21, and the waiver
of the set-aside where no LBE subcontractor is reasonably available, willing, and
qualified. See 1981 Rules & Regulations, supra note 57, § 53.44. The former provision eliminates the possibility of fraud or collusion, while the latter implies that
normal contract considerations of cost and quality are not to be ignored.
240. Subcontractors Trade Ass'n v. Koch, 96 A.D.2d at 775, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 827
(Alexander, J., dissenting).
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tracting agency determines, according to standards clearly defined
24
and uniformly applied, that only one of the bidders is responsible. 1
The concept of "responsibility" will not support the indiscriminate
addition of qualifications to the bidding process. However, including
provisiong for an LBE set-aside is neither an arbitrary nor an unwarranted extension of the term "lowest responsible bidder." The condition being imposed is no more than one aspect of a legitimate exercise
242
of the mayor's power to set the terms of and enforce city contracts.
Aside from the important policy goals served by the program, it can
be justified on a cost basis, since money spent at the contracting stage
to increase the participation of the disadvantaged renders other, potentially more burdensome, aid unnecessary. 243 There is, accordingly,
nothing to suggest that the implementation of Executive Order No. 53
will disserve the public either by unnecessarily increasing costs or
encouraging favoritism, fraud or corruption. Thus, no basis exists for
finding the LBE program to be inconsistent with state and local
competitive bidding statutes.
VIII. Conclusion
Executive Order No. 53 has effectively increased the participation
in city contracts of small businesses and residents from economically
underdeveloped areas. 244 Although similar in format to set-asides em-

241. Picone v. City of New York, 176 Misc. 967, 969, 29 N.Y.S.2d 539, 541 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1941). See also Pilot Mechanical Corp. v. Carroll, 94 Misc. 2d 437,
441, 404 N.Y.S.2d 839, 841 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1978)(city validly did not
award contract, even though complainant was lowest responsible bidder, because of
lack of compliance with Executive Order No. 89, requiring contractors to offer
employees health and welfare programs as well as pension plans).
242. See supra notes 205-07 and accompanying text. Conversely, where a set-aside
program is adopted without specific authorization, an attempt to expand the term
"responsible" to include compliance with a social policy is much more likely to be
regarded as suspect. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. San Francisco
Unified Sch. Dist., 431 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Cal. 1977), afJ'd, 616 F.2d 1381 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980). Here, the board of education was not
merely attempting to show that its 25 percent MBE set-aside was consistent with the
state competitive bidding statute, but rather was using the concept of "lowest responsible bidder" to justify its affirmative action plan. The court held that the board
could not rely on the competitive bidding statute to require compliance with a policy
which, because of the lack of legislative authority, it was powerless to impose. 431 F.
Supp. at 857-58.
243. See Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 37,
249 N.E.2d 907, 910 (any increase in cost resulting from inclusion of affirmative
action requirements in public contracts is offset by costs of securing like degree of
compliance by means of public prosecutions and administrative proceedings).
244. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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ployed in other affirmative action programs, it avoids many of their
adverse consequences. In particular, the utilization of social and economic classifications enables the LBE set-aside to withstand equal
protection scrutiny. 245 Even the most beneficent of objectives, of
course, cannot support mayoral action taken without proper authority. New York City mayors, however, have used executive orders on a
number of occasions to further policy goals. 246 The mayor should also
have the use of this tool to aid locally based enterprises, especially
since the conditions imposed reflect generally accepted policy considerations, the procedures to be followed are clearly articulated, and the
criteria used are neutral, offending neither constitutional nor statutory provisions.
Stephen L. Weinstein
245. See supra notes 169-84 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 18.

